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COMMENT
DRAINING THE ALCOA "WISHING WELL": THE SECTION 2 CONDUCT
REQUIREMENT AFTER KODAK AND CALCOMP
INTRODUCTION
"Hard competition" by established monopolists has been endorsed in recent
court opinions.1 These decisions have focused renewed attention on the
applicable standard of culpable conduct 2 required under section 2 of the
Sherman Act 3 (the Act) to turn lawful monopoly into unlawful monopoliza-
1. E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for
cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); California Computer Prods.,
Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,713 (9th Cir. 1979); Telex Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Transamerica Computer
Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed sub nora. Memorex Corp. v.
IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979). In each of these cases, the court was
presented with a substantial record of the strategic development, announcement, and introduc-
tion of new products, as well as aggressive sales and marketing practices. The cases held that the
individual business practices reflected the monopolist's success through superior products and
business acumen, and not unlawful anticompetitive conduct. See generally, Millstein, Courts Are
Accepting Areeda-Turner Thesis, Legal Times of Wash., Sept. 17, 1979, at 9, col. ; Baker,
Berkey, CalComp Cases Support Innovation by Dominant Enterprise, Nat'l L. J., Sept. 10, 1979,
at 22, col. 1; Sims, 'Kodak' Pro-aides Comfort for Trust Defendants, Legal Times of Wash., July
16, 1979, at 13, col. 1.
2. Anticompetitive business practices are commonly characterized as either "predatory" or
"exclusionary." Both terms, however, have different legal and economic definitions. Predation, in
economic terms, refers to anticompetitive conduct that tends to eliminate competing firms from a
market, to deter new entry into the market, or to intimidate competitors from engaging in
vigorous competition. Thus, pricing has been considered predatory if below cost or at a
non-profit-maximizing level. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 703-18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Predatory Pricing]. See also Bain, A Note on Predatory Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39
Am. Econ. Rev. 448 (1949). Predatory conduct is used in a broader legal sense to include business
practices that unreasonably restrict the level of competition in a market by "inhibit[ing] others in
ways independent of the predator's own ability to perform effectively in the market." L. Sullivan,
Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 43, at 111 (1977). Such conduct may also be described as
exclusionary. Because all business decisions and policies are aimed at drawing customers away
from competing firms, the concept of "exclusion" is particularly difficult to define. It commonly
refers to acts which allow a firm to eliminate or injure rivals without regard to their efficiency. 3
P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law, 626b-626c (1978). Professor Posner describes an
exclusionary practice as "a method by which a firm.., trades a part of its monopoly profits, at
least temporarily, for a larger market share, by making it unprofitable for other sellers to compete
with it." R. Posner, Antitrust Law 28 (1976); see Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other
Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1219 (1969). "Predatory" and "exclusion-
ary" are conclusory terms; characterizing business practices as either does not explain why they
are unlawful. The meaning of either term is generally ascertainable from the specific facts
examined. Attorney General's National Committee to Study The Antitrust Laws, Report 327-28
(1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Report]. ("[T]he accusation of 'predatory' . . . practices often
turns out on examination not to stem from the abuse of significant degrees of market power, but
from the uncomfortably active pressures of competition itself.")
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976): "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
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tion. The offense of monopolization under section 2 requires more than the
mere possession of monopoly power. 4 The Supreme Court most recently spoke
in terms of "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident." s Judicial efforts to make a meaningful
distinction have proven extremely difficult.
Several lower courts, 6 in deciding suits by private plaintiffs, have found
that many alleged exclusionary practices merely reflect a monopolist's superior
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony
. .. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, creates a private right of action for treble
damages in favor of "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." To be entitled to damages in a private action,
plaintiff must prove 1) an antitrust violation, 2) an injury to plaintiff's "business or property"
caused by the violation, and 3) a basis for a reasonable estimate of the amount of damages
resulting from defendant's unlawful conduct. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). An antitrust decree or judgment in favor of the government can be
used as prima facie evidence of liability against the same defendant in the private action. 15
U.S.C. § 16(a).
4. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), petitionfor
cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427) ("The mere possession of
monopoly power does not ipso facto condemn a market participant."); California Computer
Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCHI 62,713, at 77,974-75 (9th Cir. 1979);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 9, 123 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18,
1979). Because size may be the unavoidable result of a legal monopoly or the consequence of
vigorous competitive activity, size, absent unlawful conduct or an intent to monopolize, is not an
antitrust offense. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (section 2 does not in fact condemn "monopoly In
the concrete'). Despite this well-settled rule of law, however, some courts still suggest that the
mere existence of monopoly power offends the antitrust laws. E.g., United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 107 (1948) ("monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may Itself
constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexercised'); United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) ("Mere size . . . is not an offense against the
Sherman Act unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly . . . ."); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Congress . . . did not
condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbad all."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Monopoly power is "the power to control prices
or exclude competition." United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956). Such power is a primary requisite to a finding of monopolization, and may be a factor in
judging the reasonableness of alleged anticompetitive conduct. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d at 272 (section 2 is aimed "at a pernicious market structure"). Monopoly
power remains, however, a separate element of the offense. This Comment's discussion of the
culpable conduct element of unlawful monopolization assumes arguendo the existence of
monopoly power.
5. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). This standard has been
routinely cited in virtually every subsequent case involving monopolization. See, e.g., Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3174, (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM
Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,974 (9th Cir. 1979); Transamerica Computer
Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979).
6. See cases cited note I supra.
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product, business acumen, or "skill, foresight and industry, '"7 and not willful
maintenance of monopoly power. These decisions, of which Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak)8 and California Computer Products, Inc.
v. IBM Corp. (CalComp),9 are the most notable,' 0 are characterized by strict
objective tests to detect the existence of exclusionary conduct. Challenged
business practices are tested individually in terms of rational economic
behavior. I" The conduct speaks for itself: if a given practice results from an
objectively rational business decision, no inquiry need be made into the
subjective intent behind the practice. 12
7. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d. Cir. 1945). "Skill,
foresight and industry" may generally be defined as superior competitive practices that reflect an
intent to compete on the merits of price and performance. Id. These practices are of the type
which are encouraged by the antitrust laws. See notes 25-32 infra and accompanying text; cf. 148
F.2d at 430 (only a "strong argument" may be made that § 2 does not condemn the result of those
very competitive forces which is its primary object to foster).
8. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
9. [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713 (9th Cir. 1979).
10. In Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 925 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
802 (1975), the Tenth Circuit essentially took the same position as did the courts in Kodak and
CalComp with respect to rigorous competition by a monopolist to protect its market power. The
Tenth Circuit reversed the jury verdict in favor of Telex, however, on market definition grounds.
Thus, its discussion of conduct was merely dicta and, many thought, largely overshadowed by
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978). The 1975 Telex decision takes on new significance in
light of the decisions in Kodak and CalComp, both of which looked to Telex for direction. Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1979), petitionfor cert.filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM
Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,983 (9th Cir. 1979); see Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979); ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed sub noma. Memorex
Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979). For a discussion of the
implications of Telex, see Note, Innovation Competition: Beyond Telex v. IBM, 28 Stan. L. Rev.
289 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Innovation Competition].
11. Alleged exclusionary practices are economically rational if they represent, for example,
above cost pricing (profitability), California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 11979-11 Trade
Cas. (CCR) t 62,713 (9th Cir. 1979); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979), satisfaction of consumer preferences (increased sales volume), Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed,
48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427), and profitabilitylcost savings of leasing and
bundling policies (legitimate business justifications). Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894
(10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979),
petitionfor cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); California Computer
Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CC) 62,713, at 77,980 (9th Cir. 1979). It is
not the role of the court to second guess business or engineering decisions. 603 F.2d at 287;
Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 438-39 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal
docketed sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979);
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 347 (N.D. OkIa. 1973), retd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
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This strong encouragement of vigor, rather than passivity, by the
monopolist in developing and marketing its products is a dramatic departure
from the more traditional concern for detecting an exclusionary "course of
conduct."1 3 Under the course of conduct analysis, economically rational
business practices which individually may be lawful and "honestly indus-
trial," are evaluated in terms of the intent with which they were adopted:
whether the primary purpose is competition on the merits or the elimination
of competition.14 Purpose is inferred from evidence of other related conduct
and from the subjective intent of management. 15 Thus, any number of
otherwise lawful business practices may be deemed a willful maintenance of
monopoly power when viewed in light of " 'all the circumstances of a case.' "16
The whole, it appears, is greater than the sum of its parts.
Kodak and CalComp implicitly reject this view. In so doing, they invite
comparison with the earliest section 2 cases. 17 According to the early theory,
13. "Course of conduct" is a term which rarely appears in court opinions, and Is given little
emphasis when it does. It is, however, closely associated with the traditional legal rule under § 2
that any number of lawful acts in and of themselves may evidence an unlawful intent to
monopolize, or an exclusionary course of conduct. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as limited to manoeuvres
not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can such a course,
indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.' "). The term played an important role In
Judge Frankel's instructions to the jury on the issue of predisclosure in Kodak: "Standing alone,
the fact that Kodak did not give advance warning of its new products to competitors would not
entitle you to find that this conduct was exclusionary .... However, if you find that Kodak had
monopoly power ... , you may decide whether in the light of other conduct you determine to be
anticompetitive, Kodak's failure to predisclose was on balance an exclusionary course of con-
duct." Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 414 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S.
Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427) (emphasis added) (transcript no. omitted).
14. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (attempt to monopolize).
Intent is the element that ties together otherwise lawful acts into an exclusionary course of
conduct. In his discussion of conspiracy and attempt to monopolize, Justice Holmes stated: "The
scheme as a whole seems to us to be within reach of the law. The constituent elements, as we
have stated them, are enough to give to the scheme a body .... It is suggested that the several
acts charged are lawful and that intent can make no difference. But they are bound together as
the parts of a single plan. The plan may make the parts unlawful." Id. (citation omitted); see
United States v. IBM Corp., [1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,495, at 67,176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
15. L. Sullivan, supra note 2, § 51, at 135-37.
16. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rcv'd
in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition far cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14,
1979) (No. 79-427) (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49
(1977)). Judge Frankel carefully instructed the jury to consider each alleged anticompetitive act In
light of all the relevant evidence: the extent of market power, relative character of new product
introductions, related pricing practices, and manifest intent of corporate management. "While per
se rules of liabililty are useful and comfortable where they exist, the task usually is to weigh 'all of
the circumstances of a case' to determine whether a company has engaged in unlawfully
anticompetitive practices. The ultimate judgment . . . must commonly rest 'upon demonstrable
economic effect rather than ...upon formalistic line drawing.' " Id. (citations omitted). This
approach was overruled by the court of appeals, which adopted a presumptive legality test for
sales and marketing practices. 603 F.2d at 275-76.
17. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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under which only unreasonable restraints of trade were condemned, a corpo-
ration could grow without limit, even within its own market, provided it did
so by "normal methods."' 8 The recent cases suggest in part a return to the
early standard. Unlawful monopolization under Kodak and CalComnp is not
inferred from normal, "honestly industrial"1 9 practices which have an
exclusionary economic effect due solely to the rigors of competition; they are
not unreasonable responses to competition. On the contrary, the monopolist'
given greater freedom to fight off its competitors with the same lawful
weapons with which those competitors are assaulting its dominant positionj
The degree of conduct necessary to prove unlawful monopoly is uncertain.
The Supreme Court has not recently addressed the issue,2 0 and lower courts
18. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911); see United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32
(1918); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). While § I of the Act
prohibits agreements, combinations and conspiracies between firms which unreasonably restrain
trade, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), § 2 proscribes unilateral acts by the monopolist which have the same
effect. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. at 61 e"[Tlhe second
section seeks . . . to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by
embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section .. . . "); see note 3 supra
This approach has "the least sweeping implications . . . .An enterprise has monopolized in
violation of § 2 ... [only] if it has acquired or maintained a power to exclude others as a result of
using an unreasonable 'restraint of trade,' in violation of § I of the Sherman Act." United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954). Despite having the "least sweeping implications," this approach appears to be gaining
credence in evaluating conduct in private treble damage actions. In CalComp, for example, the
court stated that a monopolist's acts "are properly analyzed analogously to [agreements] under § 1
the test is whether defendant's acts . . .were unreasonably restrictive of competition."
California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,975
(9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original). It is also interesting to note that the only claim against
Kodak that the Second Circuit upheld was an agreement with Sylvania providing for nondisclo-
sure of photoflash developments to rival camera manufacturers, an agreement which was found
to be per se unlawful under § 1. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 304 (2d
Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427).
19. The phrase "honestly industrial," like so many others in the § 2 lexicon, was coined in a
very different context by Judge Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945). In that case, the court stated that to limit proscribed acts under § 2 to
only those not "honestly industrial" would emasculate the Act. Accord, United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
20. The most recent Supreme Court case addressing the conduct issue is United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). The Court appears to have become much more tolerant of
arguments predicated upon the efficiency-creating nature of the defendant's conduct than it had
been during the 1960's. See Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182, 1184 (1977)
("Perhaps in response to the open-ended and uncertain evolution of antitrust policy during the era
of the Warren Court, there has been a renewed effort to bring greater certainty and predictability
to antitrust analysis... "); Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics,
Populism, and Cynicism, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 325, 334-35 (1968). Practices under § 1, for example,
once held per se unlawful, are now deemed procompetitive when examined under the rule of
reason. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 99 S. CL 1551 (1979) (blanket licensing
facilitates integration of sales, monitors and enforces against unauthorized copyright use, in-
creases economic efficiency, and renders the market more competitive); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical agreements between manufacturer and retailer
may promote interbrand competition by allowing manufacturer to achieve efficiencies in distribu-
tion).
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are inconsistent in their approach. 21 Moreover, while some cases are endors-
ing hard competition by dominant firms, proposed legislation 22 would replace
the need for proof of conduct in government monopolization suits seeking
divestiture with proof of persistent monopoly power alone. 23 The presumption
underlying the proposal is that monopoly power persistently maintained is in
all but the rarest cases acquired or maintained through culpable conduct. 24
These widely divergent and conflicting approaches to culpable conduct
reflect the tension inherent in the antitrust laws between the monopolist's
legitimate right to compete fairly and vigorously, on the one hand, and the
need to protect competition from abuse by monopolists, on the other. The
paradox of section 2 enforcement, which has left neither courts nor busi-
nessmen with clear guidelines of permissible practices, should be resolved
with a cogent standard of culpable conduct.
This Comment argues that the recent use of strict economic tests in
evaluating anticompetitive conduct under section 2 is a well-reasoned formu-
lation of objective legal standards, but that it must be complemented with a
limited inquiry into -related conduct and intent to prevent more subtle forms
of anticompetitive conduct. Part I presents the modern "structuralist" ap-
proach to section 2 enforcement and the legal tests implicit in that approach.
The course of conduct standard for permissible business practices is examined
and found to be at odds with the stated goals of the Sherman Act and early
standards of predatory conduct. The strict objective tests of Kodak and
CalComp are set forth in Part II. The tests articulated in these cases represent
a repudiation of the course of conduct approach and a partial return to the
earlier standard of predatory conduct. The merits and failures of the discrete
conduct analysis is demonstrated by applying the test to several sales and
marketing practices. Part III presents a proposed judicial approach that
distinguishes between standards of culpable conduct applicable in private and
government antitrust suits. In private treble-damage actions, a monopolist's
conduct should be judged by strict economic tests coupled with a limited
inquiry into substantial intent. Finally, this Comment urges the courts to
adopt a separate no-conduct standard in government suits upon a showing of
persistent monopoly power.
21. Unlike Kodak and CalComp, many other cases are characterized by the course of conduct
analysis. E.g., Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,675 (9th
Cir. 1979); Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W.
3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D.
Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 432 U.S. 802 (1975); Borden, Inc.,
[1979] 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCM), 21,490 (Nov. 7, 1978) (opinion of the Comm'n).
22. See National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Law and Procedures, Report to the
President and the Attorney General 141-74 (1979) (hereinafter cited as National Commission]; see
Maher, 'No-Conduct Monopolization'-Proposed Legislation, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 1979, at 1,
col. 1.
23. National Commission, supra note 22, at 152.
24. Id. at 155.
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I. STRUCTURALIST APPROACH
A. The Early Standard: Predatory Conduct
The motives behind the Sherman Act and the perceived evils which it was
intended to remedy have been debated at length. 25 In enacting the Sherman
Act, Congress was undoubtedly concerned with private abuses of economic
power in the marketplace and with increasing industrial concentration in the
form of business trusts. 26 The Sherman Act was designed not to protect
competitors against their own inefficiencies, but to protect the competitive
process against unreasonable restraints. 27  Size, because it gives the
monopolist the power to set prices and restrict output, 28 was suspect to the
extent it conflicted with consumer welfare. 29 But the Act did not condemn
monopoly qua monopoly, nor did it mandate atomistic industries. 30 Rather,
25. Commentators have attempted to use the legislative history of the Sherman Act and its
early judicial interpretation to support various contentions in the relentless debate over economic
versus noneconomic goals of the Act See generally Bork & Bowman, The Goals of Antitrust: A
Dialogue on Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363 (1965); Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust:
Science or Religion?, 50 Va. L. Rev. 413 (1964). Extensive research has been conducted on the
events leading up to the passage of the Sherman Act. E.g., W. Letwin, Law and Economic Policy
in America (1965); H. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (1955). In his inquiry into the
debates on the Sherman Act, Prof. Bork concludes that Congress intended the new law to
promote efficiency and consumer welfare exclusively. R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1978);
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & Econ. 7 (1966).
26. Senators Hoar and Edmunds thought that the proposed Act did little more than bring
national authority to bear upon common law restraints of trade. 21 Cong. Rec. 315 1-52 (1890).
The existing common law rules of restraints of trade, however, grew out of several different
traditions and were often at odds with each other. Moreover, Congress enacted the legislation in
part because Congress was not certain the common law of the United States governed the subject.
Id. at 3152; see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). It appears that what
was meant by common law restraints were anticompetitive practices such as cartel agreements,
monopolistic horizontal mergers, and predatory business tactics. See R. Bork, supra note 25, at
20; R- Posner, supra note 2, at 23. For a discussion of the English and American law on restraints
of trade, see Justice White's discussion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 50-58.
The language of the statute was chosen in large part so that the Act's reach would be
coextensive with the Supreme Court's demarcation of Congress's commerce power. R. Bork,
supra note 25, at 20. Many early Sherman Act defendants, including Standard Oil, argued that
the statute could not be constitutionally applied because it was an attempt by Congress to extend
its commerce power by regulating questions of intrastate production. That argument was rejected
in Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 68-69, and in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 334
(1904).
27. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
[1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,980 (9th Cir. 1979); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
579 F.2d 126, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 340 (1979).
28. See United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956);
R. Posner, supra note 2, at 23.
29. R. Bork, supra note 25, at 35-36. Justice White suggested three "evils" that led to the
public outcry against monopolies and restraints of trade: the power of the monopolist to fix prices,
to limit production, and to deteriorate the quality of products. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911). Deterioration in quality is merely a special form of diminished quantity or
restricted output.
30. See C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy 20 (1959) ("In short . . . protection of
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the sponsors intended to exempt from the Act's proscriptions one "who merely
by superior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business because nobody
could do it as well."'31 Unlawful monopolization "involved something like
the use of means which made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair
competition."
32
Justice White's 1911 opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States33 was the
first clear articulation of standards governing section 2 monopolization. 3 4 The
Court held that the offense of monopolization required both monopoly power
incentives to competitive behavior would prevail over dispersion of market power."); note 25
supra. Populist rhetoric still persists, however, in court opinions suggesting that the goal of the
Sherman Act is the protection of small competitors against rivals. Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The populist origins of the Act were reflected by the debates; "If we will
not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king over the production,
transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life." 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890) (remarks of
Sen. Sherman). Judge Learned Hand was of the opinion that a principle purpose of the framers
"was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other." United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Transamerica Computer
Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 57 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979).
31. 21 Cong. Rec. 3152 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Hoar). Power obtained or maintained by the
kind of behavior that competition is thought to foster, if not compel, was immune from antitrust
scrutiny even though rivals might have been destroyed in the process. See, e.g., California
Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,975 n.6 (9th
Cir. June 21, 1979). Vigorous competition produces winners and losers. The very essence of
competition is a "striving for potentially incompatible positions" in which the success of one
competitor is likely to be achieved at the expense of another. F Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance 9 (1970).
32. 21 Cong. Rec. 3152 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Hoar) (emphasis added).
33. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911). The record on appeal to the
Supreme Court in Standard Oil was precedent-setting and foreshadowed the era of complex,
protracted litigation under § 2. The complaint and exhibits filed by the Government on
November 15, 1906, covered 170 pages of the printed record, itself consisting of 23 volumes,
aggregating some 12,000 pages. Id. at 30-31. The enormous volume of proof related to
innumerable, complex and varied business transactions, extending over a period of nearly forty
years. See W. Letwin, supra note 25, at 253 ("The groundwork of the assault had been laid by the
Bureau of Corporations, which prepared a report of unparalleled detail. The case was the
beginning of modern antitrust actions . . .
34. Justice White established the "rule of reason" analysis, 221 U.S. at 61-62, against a
vigorous dissent by Justice Harlan. 221 U.S. at 82 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part). Condemned under the Sherman Act, according to Justice White's interpretation, were all
unreasonable restraints of trade. Id. at 61. In a somewhat strained interpretation of two earlier
cases, United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), and United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), Justice White concluded that the Court had always
applied an implied test of reasonableness to contracts in restraint of trade without expressly
stating it. Thus, certain offenses like price-fixing were put into a per se category only after
examining them in the light of reason. 221 U.S. at 64-65. Per se analysis is a subspecies of the
rule of reason analysis. Thus, the so-called "rule of reason" was developed in fact, If not in name,
in these earlier cases. R. Bork, supra note 25, at 34. See generally United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), which was decided two weeks after Standard Oil.
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and conduct resulting in an unreasonable restraint of trade. The latter is
analyzed in the same manner as agreements under section 1.31
The Court enumerated two factors bearing on the "reasonableness" of a
monopolist's acts: 1) whether the acts were "normal methods of industrial
development;" 36 and 2) whether the acts were unduly coercive. 37 By opening
an inquiry into the reasonableness of monopoly, Standard Oil implies that
many uses of monopoly power are reasonable and, indeed, beneficial. 38
Inherent in Justice White's analysis is the belief that the successful competitor
is entitled to his just rewards and should not be penalized for having fairly
acquired a monopoly. 39 Moreover, his analysis is based on the assumption
that competition works; market forces were expected to prevent or erode
35. 221 U.s. at 59-62. Section 2 was intended to supplement § 1 and to ensure that the policy
embodied therein was not frustrated or evaded. See note 18 supro.
36. Id. at 75.
37. Id. Unusual methods and coercive acts were considered "solely as an aid for discovering
intent and purpose." Id. at 76. The intent "to exclude others . . . [is] frequently manifested by
acts and dealings wholly inconsistent with the theory that they were made with the single
conception of advancing the development of business power by usual methods, but which on the
contrary necessarily involved the intent to drive others from the field and to exclude them from
their right to trade and thus accomplish the mastery which was the end in view." Id. Justice
White inferred wrongful intent from wrongful conduct. The result would have been identical and
the analysis clearer had he ignored intent and spoken of conduct alone. P. Areeda & D. Turner.
supra note 2, 626, at 76; R. Bork, supra note 25, at 37-39.
38. The rule of reason analysis entertains business justifications and defenses of superior skill.
In what Justice White characterized as a "powerful analysis of the facts", he noted Standard Oil's
argument that its power was "the result of lawful competitive methods, guided by economic
genius of the highest order, sustained by courage, by a keen insight into commercial situations,
resulting in the acquisition of great wealth, but at the same time serving to stimulate and increase
production, to widely extend the distribution of the products of petroleum at a cost largely below
that which would have otherwise prevailed." 221 U.S. at 48. Standard Oil also argued that
alleged acts of wrongdoing were either the result of "too great individual zeal in the keen rivalries
of business or of the methods and habits of dealing which, even if wrong, were commonly
practiced at the time." Id.
The record on actual predatory conduct in Standard Oil has been extensively debated since
Prof. John McGee's study, Predatory Price Cutting: Tie Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, I J.L. &
Econ. 137 (1958). McGee reviewed the entire record of the Standard Oil litigation and reported
that there were no dear episodes of the successful use of predatory pricing or other predatory
practices. But see F. Scherer, supra note 31, at 275 (arguing that McGee would have found
predatory price cutting by Standard Oil had he searched the Rockefeller paperl). It is interesting
in this context to note the language of the Tenth Circuit in Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d
894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975), exonerating the conduct of the defendants
despite a substantial record of anticompetitive intent: "The record demonstrates that these acts of
IBM are again part of the competitive scene in this volatile business inhabited by aggressive,
skillful businessmen.. . . It is IBM's participation in this marketing that the trial court termed
'predatory,' but the record shows this was no more than engaging in the type of competition
prevalent throughout the industry." Id. at 928.
39. Justice White suggested that a benefit of adopting a rule of reason analysis instead of
condemning all contracts in restraint of trade, as Justice Harlan had advocated, 221 U.S. at 82
(Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), was that it would protect defendants
against an unreasonable restriction on the right to contract or right to acquire or hold property.
Id. at 69.
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monopoly power if economic freedom were not unreasonably restrained by acts
of the monopolist.
40
B. The Traditional Standard: Course of Conduct
The great merger movement that produced the classic trusts ended in about
1905, and by 1911 most of the antitrust cases challenging these mergers had
been decided. 4 1 By 1945, however, it was no longer assumed that self-policing
market forces would inevitably prevent monopolies if the government re-
strained anticompetitive acts. 42 Perhaps as a consequence of this understand-
ing, courts increasingly directed antitrust analysis toward market concentra-
tion. Beginning with Judge Hand's decision in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America (Alcoa)43 and continuing until the present, the emphasis has
been on monopoly power.
4 4
Alcoa and its progeny have been considered to set forth a "structural" test
of monopoly. 45 The structural approach is posited on the belief that effective
40. 221 U.S. at 62. "[ihe omission of any direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete
... indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to contract ... was the
most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly, since the operation of the centrifugal and
centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract was the means by which monopoly
would be inevitably prevented if ... no right to make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic
tendency were permitted." Id.
41. R. Posner, supra note 2, at 27; see Shepard, The Economics: A Pep Talk, 41 A.B.A.
Antitrust L.J. 595, 598 (1972) ("Section 2 was tried on most of the top 10 [industrial firms as of
1911]. U.S. Steel, Standard Oil, American Tobacco, International Harvester, American Sugar,
Corn Products, American Can, duPont are among those at the very top of the business ladder
[which were sued for monopolization]".).
42. In 1940, there was a sharp and permanent increase in the volume of antitrust cases
brought by the Justice Department under antitrust chief Thurman Arnold. At the same time, the
Supreme Court became noticeably more friendly to antitrust enforcement. R. Posner, supra note
2, at 84 n.7.
43. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Government's complaint was filed in April, 1937; trial
began in June, 1938, and proceeded until August, 1940. More than 40,000 pages of testimony
were taken. After delivering an oral opinion, findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court entered final judgment dismissing the government's complaint in July, 1942. On appead, the
Second Circuit acted as the court of last resort because the Supreme Court could not muster a
quorum of six qualified justices to hear the case. Therefore, the matter was referred for decision
under special statute to the court of appeals in the circuit from which it came. Id. at 421 (citing 15
U.S.C. § 29 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1976)). The Alcoa case is an example of
the type of protracted litigation that largely makes the relief stage ineffective if not irrelevant.
Although the case was brought in 1937, it was not decided until after World War II. The
enormous increase in the demand for aluminum during the war resulted in the creation and rapid
expansion of competing aluminum producers, so that by 1950 Alcoa no longer had a monopoly
market share and substantial divestiture was rightly judged unnecessary and inappropriate. Id. at
432. See generally O'Connor, The Divestiture Remedy in Sherman Act § 2 Cases, 13 Harv. J.
Legis. 687 (1976).
44. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954). See also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427).
45. See National Commission, supra note 22, at 156; id. at 346 (separate statement by Comm.
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antitrust policy cannot be built entirely on rules of law prohibiting "unfair"
business conduct, and that rules aimed at preventing "unfair" industry
structure must be fashioned. 46 Big is inherently bad. 47 These cases have
placed severe limitations on a monopolist's ability to compete by condemning
"honestly industrial" acts, not predatory or coercive under earlier standards,
that, when viewed as a course of conduct, are in economic effect exclusion-
ary-4
8
The Alcoa court recognized that the mere existence of monopoly power is
not sufficient to constitute the offense of monopolization under section 2, and
that "something else" is required.4 9 The standard, established in Alcoa and
further refined and applied in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., SO
Eleanor Fox); 1955 Report, supra note 2, at 55 n.207; Northwestern Univ., Conference on the
Antitrust Laws and the Attorney General's Committee Report 38 (1955); Rostow, Monopoly
Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 nl1. L. Rev. 745, 762 (1949); Rostow, The New
Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. Chi. L.R. 567, 577-80 (1947); Turner,
supra note 2, at 1219;Antitrust Symposium: Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 10 Sw. U. L. Rev. 35,
129 (1978) (closing remarks of District Court Judge Wyzanski).
46. Mueller, The New Antitrust: A 'Structural' Approach, 1 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 87,
108 (Winter 1967).
47. Natural monopolists, those whose monopoly power has been "thrust upon" them, are not
condemned for that fact alone. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30
(2d Cir. 1945). Under the maximum reading of the structural cases, unlawful monopolization is
established by monopoly power alone unless the defendant can show that it has been the "passive
beneficiary" of monopoly power. See notes 72-79 infra and accompanying text. Such a view is
tantamount to saying that the mere status of monopoly offends § 2. Under a less radical reading
of the structural cases, monopolization is shown by proof of monopoly power alone unless
defendant shows that its monopoly resulted solely from superior skill, foresight and industry.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964),
aff'd in part, 384 U:S. 563 (1966). Such an approach would appear to give the putative
monopolist very limited freedom to engage in a volitional act which maintained its market
position.
48. 148 F.2d at 431. Alcoa, however, has been regarded as "something of an intellectual sport
-the high watermark of overly zealous Section 2 enforcement-important to classroom and
academic analysis, but.., less important to the real world." Baker, FTC's Use of Alcoa, DuPont
Cases Puts More Businesses in Jeopardy, Nat'l L.J., April 23, 1979, at 23, col. 2. Nevertheless,
Alcoa does have a significant influence on the "real world." The Alcoa doctrine is still cited by
counsel and court in private as well as government suits, even though its specific holding is not
controlling on what are invariably distinguishable fact patterns. Moreover, the decision has been
resorted to of late, purposely or unwittingly, as a weapon to curb efficiency in the name of
"competitive equality." See, e.g. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (19791 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCII) 21,613 (Sept. 4, 1979); Borden, Inc., [197913 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,490 (Nov. 7,
1978). Finally, the decision in Alcoa lends direct support to advocates of legislative proposals
eliminating the conduct element from government suits for unlawful monopolization. See notes
238-254 infra and accompanying text.
49. 148 F.2d at 429. "This notion has usually been expressed by saying ... that there must be
some 'exclusion' of competitors; that the growth must be something else than 'natural' or 'normal';
that there must be a 'wrongful intent,' or some other specific intent; or that some 'unduly' coercive
means must be used." Id.
50. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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is one of deliberateness. 5 1 Despite this attempt to define a standard, however,
the requisite "something else" remains vague.
1. Deliberateness
Deliberateness is variously stated in terms of conduct or intent. The opinion
in Alcoa has been broadly interpreted 5 2 to mean that a firm with substantial
market power is subject to more stringent rules of fair competition than those
promulgated under section 1. The plaintiff is no longer required, as he had
been under Standard Oil, to prove an unreasonable restraint of trade such as
would violate section 1.53 Under both Alcoa and United Shoe, culpable
conduct may be any voluntary or other than "inevitable" market practices
which, when considered as a course of conduct, have the primary effect of
preserving existing monopoly power. 54 In terms of intent, the alleged
monopolist need not have a specific intent to monopolize. All that is required
is a general intent to do the acts which led to the establishment or perpetua-
tion of monopoly power. 55 Even a generalized purpose to attain a monopoly
or eliminate competitors is not essential. 56
51. See 1955 Report, supra note 2, at 43; Blecher & Woodhead, Bigness and Badness: A
Review of the Requirement of "Deliberateness" in Monopolization, 10 Sw. U. L, Rev. 117 (1978).
52. The most literal reading of Alcoa indicates that a lawfully acquired monopoly may enjoy its
status free of antitrust scrutiny only so long as it keeps its prices high, at an entry inducing level,
and limits its capacity. Alcoa was found liable for monopolizing the virgin aluminum ingot
market because it had aggressively promoted the use cf aluminum, a relatively new metal In
which it had early patents. 148 F.2d at 430-31. A general intent to monopolize was inferred from
the voluntary decision to maintain low profit margins and continuously expand output In
anticipation of greater demand. Id. Judge Hand may well have rested his judgment on facts
outside the trial court record. Some of the more convincing evidence during the trial dealt with
Alcoa's systematic purchase of bauxite deposits in the United States and the Caribbean for the
alleged purpose of pre-empting access by potential competitors. Id, at 422. The intent with which
these and other such purchases were made-whether they were needed for an adequate future
supply or merely to ensure an absolute barrier to entrants--was a major issue in the case. Id. at
432-33. After hearing several witnesses on behalf of Alcoa, the trial judge ruled in Alcoa's favor.
The court of appeals was bound by the district court's findings of fact because Judge Hand did
not rule as a matter of law that they were clearly erroneous under Fed. R. Clv. P. 52(a), In
*United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954), Judge Wyzanski, reviewing the Alcoa decision, speculated that Judge Hand
did not rest his judgment on Alcoa's coercive practices "perhaps because he was cabined by the
findings of the District Court." Id. at 341. See also Turner, supra note 2, at 1219.
53. In Alcoa, Judge Hand upheld the trial court's finding of no unlawful practices by Alcoa.
148 F.2d at 432-39. He concluded, however, that Alcoa meant "to 'monopolize' the market,
however innocently it otherwise proceeded." Id. at 432. In United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 330,
344, Judge Wyzanski went out of his way to commend the defendant for its lack of any taint or
wrongdoing for over forty years.
54. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F,2d at 429-32; United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 343-44.
55. 148 F.2d at 431-32. The element of general intent differs from the more demanding
concept of "specific intent," which refers to the conscious purpose of the monopolist to exclude
competitors. 1955 Report, supra note 2, at 55. The general intent standard has been criticized as
"based upon the 'structure' test of monopoly to which intent is irrelevant . . . .Perhaps it would be
bettir so to state than to leave the provision in terms of an intent which in itself can scarcely be
mehningful." Id. at 56 n.211.
56. 1955 Report, supra note 2, at 55-56 & n.211.
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The course of conduct approach obliterates the once clear line between
conscious exclusion by predation and the inevitable exclusion by efficiencies. s 7
Alcoa had argued that its performance was evidence of the skill, energy and
initiative with which it had always conducted its business.s Indeed, the court
acknowledged that Alcoa had stimulated demand and use for aluminum.59
Moreover, there was impressive evidence that Alcoa's prices were fairly
competitive as a result of the close substitutability of other metals and the
threat of potential entry by foreign producers. 60 Nevertheless, the court
pointed out that as a matter of law the reasonableness of Alcoa's prices and
profits was irrelevant to the charge of monopolization. 61 Judge Hand prefaced
his discussion of the law with a statement reflecting his belief in the political
tradition of antitrust, namely, a dislike of concentrations of private power
despite their economic advantages. 62 According to the decision, the purpose of
the Act is to "preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost," an
industrial structure of small competing units.63 The court ironically seemed to
agree, however, that it would be unfair to punish a firm for sheer industrial
success.
64
Although Alcoa seemed to be doing the things expected and encouraged in a
competitive market-keeping prices and profits down, stimulating demand,
and being prepared to meet that demand on reasonable terms-the history of
Alcoa and the structure of the aluminum indus&yad a-major influence on
the result in the case. The court was apparently convinced that Alcoa's
monopoly position rested on more than technical and business skill. During
the same twenty-five year period in which Alcoa's output increased 800%, no
other company had succeeded in breaking into this basic manufacturing
industry, despite the industry's widely known technology. 6S Culpable conduct
or intent was therefore inferred from the fact that Alcoa - inailed
5TeThe-ominance over the market for so long.66 The court concluded that
Alcoa "meant to keep, and did keep, [market control]" and intended to
" 'monopolize' that market," even though it had engaged in a course of
conduct consisting of admittedly "honestly industrial" business policies. 67
57. R. Posner, supra note 2, at 215-16.
58. 148 F.2d at 429-31.
59. Id. at 430.
60. Id. at 425-26.
61. Id. at 427.
62. Id. "It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small
producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the
great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which we
have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in
fact its purposes." Id.
63. Id. at 429. But see notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text (Sherman Act intended to
protect competition, not competitors).
64. 148 F.2d at 430.
65. Id. at 430-31; see 1955 Report, supra note 2, at 60.
66. 148 F.2d at 430-31; see Turner, supra note 2, at 1219. Similarly, the net effect of the
leasing policies found unlawful in United Shoe was the exclusion of all but one significant
competitor from the shoe machinery market during United's S-year history, 110 F. Supp. at
323-25.
67. 148 F.2d at 432.
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The Alcoa court failed to distinguish natural barriers to entry, those which
the monopolist itself had to overcome, from unnatural barriers, those erected
by acts designed not to increase efficiencies, but to exclude competitors. 68
Because the course of conduct condemned in Alcoa included business practices
designed to overcome natural barriers, as well as those aimed at creating
artificial ones, the case does not indicate which business practices would not
be considered deliberate. The court in United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp. attempted to resolve the ambiguity by defining deliberateness as
the achievement or retention of monopoly power by business methods which
are more restrictive than necessary. 69
This "least restrictive alternative" analysis, however, does not adequately
define specific standards to guide businessmen and courts; virtually any
business practice, no matter how benign, might be found, with benefit of
hindsight, to have a less restrictive alternative.70 Furthermore, the least
68. See R. Posner, supra note 2, at 92-93. In both Alcoa and United Shoe, the erection of
barriers to entry itself was characterized as exclusionary conduct. Barriers to entry are most
commonly relevant to the issue of market power: the greater the barriers, the greater the power of
a monopolist to fix prices or exclude competition. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM
Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979). See generally L. Sullivan, supra
note 2, § 23. Some barriers to entry, of course, may result from predatory conduct, such as when
one manufacturer preempts the supply and control of an essential input into the manufacturing
process. Such barriers are clearly "unnatural." Others, however, such as economies of scale, cost
of capital, or advertising, are generally relevant only to a firm's relative power to control prices
and restrict output. R. Posner, supra note 2, at 92. Some recent cases have attacked as
exclusionary conduct just such natural barriers. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
[1979] 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,613 (Sept. 4, 1979) (FTC ruling dismissing complaint
charging attempt to monopolization by expanding plant capacity and maintaining low price
margins); Borden, Inc., [1979] 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,490 (Nov. 7, 1978) (willful
maintenance of monopoly power through "unreasonab'y" low prices, product differentiation,
extensive advertising, and successful trade name).
69. 110 F. Supp. at 344-45; see C. Kaysen, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.
304 (1956). United Shoe's policy of bundling free repair services to the lease of machines was
challenged as unnecessarily restrictive, because it foreclosed competition in the service industry
and made it more difficult for smaller machine manufacturers to effectively compete with United.
110 F. Supp. at 340. Nevertheless, bundling of repairs with machines serves several legitimate
business purposes. First and foremost, customers prefer it. Furthermore, the practice protects the
manufacturer's interest in quality control of its machines and safeguards its legitimate interest In
their ownership.
The court pointed, however, to United's varied line of machines, its competitive advantage In
size, resources, patents, facilities, and knowledge, its marked capacity to attract inventions,
inventors and shoe machinery businesses, and its long-term leases, as additional barriers to entry.
Id. at 343-44. Many of these barriers were concededly created as a result of United's superior skill
and products. Id. at 297. Some, however, could have been replaced with less restrictive practices.
The exclusionary leasing policy, for example, consisted of United's refusal to sell its equipment
and its insistence that users take the equipment on 10-year lease terms. The leases obligated the
lessee to use United equipment to its full capacity before using competitors' equipment, or to pay
a rental based on full capacity use. United imposed return charges payable if the lessee did not
hold the machines for their full 10-year term; in practice, the charges were collected only when
the user substituted a competitor's machine for a United machine. Id. at 319-22. Because United
could have sold its equipment or given shorter leases, the court found an exclusionary course of
conduct. See id. at 323-24.
70. Counsel for United Shoe artfully pointed out these problems on the unsuccessful appeal to
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restrictive alternative analysis fails because it emphasizes competitors, rather
than competition. Any inquiry into less restrictive alternatives in the interest
of protecting actual and potential competitors must balance that concern
against the cost to consumers and efficiency in general. The latter should be
considered the overriding concern of the antitrust laws; consumers, arguably,
should not be required to pay higher prices to subsidize less efficient rivals in
a market.
7 1
2. The Thrust-Upon Defense
The deliberateness standard is further obfuscated by the "thrust-upon"
defense created in Alcoa. 72 In theory, at least, a company which has obtained
monopoly power as the inevitable result of market forces and has done
nothing more to maintain it is not in violation of section 2. Alcoa, however,
was not "the passive beneficiary of a monopoly;" it therefore did not fall
"within the exception established in favor of those who do not seek, but
cannot avoid, the control of a market." 7
3
Monopoly power might be innocently acquired when demand only supports
a single large plant, when a change in cost or public taste has driven out all
but one supplier, or when one company out of several has survived by virtue
of superior skill, foresight and industry. 74 The thrust-upon defense fails,
the Supreme Court. See Brief for Appellant at 57-59, United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States,
347 U.S. 521 (1954), reprinted in C. Kaysen, supra note 69, at 305-06: "It is one thing to limit by
law the individual's freedom of choice in the interest of others. It is quite another thing to leave
the individual ostensibly free to choose among several courses, none of which is proscribed by the
positive or even the moral law, and then to make a case against him because his actual choice is
deemed by a court not to be 'economically inevitable.' . . . [Section 2's] prohibition against
'monopolizing' must not be perverted into a positive requirement of conducting business in a
fashion which creates a maximum of opportunities for competitors to take it away. This would be
contrary to all known laws of economics and to fundamental principles of competition." (footnote
omitted).
71. This policy consideration predominates in predatory pricing cases under § 2. See, e.g.,
Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074
(1977) ("The antitrust laws were not intended, and may not be used, to require businesses to price
their products at unreasonably high prices (which penalize the consumer) so that less efficient
competitors can stay in business. The Sherman Act is not a subsidy for inefficiency."); Interna-
tional Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 725 n.31 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); see pt. II (B)(1) infra.
72. 148 F.2d at 429-30; accord, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
73. 148 F.2d at 430-31.
74. Id. at 430. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946), the
Supreme Court suggested the additional case of a company which has made a new discovery or is
the original entrant into a new field, and thus is unavoidably possessed of monopoly power. This
situation is analogous to the innovator's temporary monopoly over its own innovations and the
peripheral products and services associated with them. Such short-lived monopolies, like those
existing by reason of patent protection, are the lawful rewards for competitive innovation. Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 291 n.49 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert.
filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510
F.2d 894, 931 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Transamerica Computer Co. v.
IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 46 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979); ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 436-37 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed sub nor.
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however, if the company acquired or retained monopoly power in part by
business actions having an exclusionary effect. Thus, a defendant monopoly
may escape statutory liability only if it bears the burden of proving that it
owes its monopoly position solely to inevitable market forces.75 This burden is
virtually impossible to bear, because ostensibly "honestly industrial" acts,
which would be used to establish the principal defense, are themselves relied
upon to find an illegal course of conduct that maintains monopoly power.
7 6
The Alcoa court appeared to link what has recently been referred to as
"persistent monopoly power" 77 with a general intent to maintain it unlaw-
fully, despite the lack of an independent showing of unlawful conduct.78 The
most striking and important interpretation derived from the Alcoa structural
test of monopoly is that both conduct and performance become irrelevant to
the prima facie case of monopolization, and are relegated to rebutting
presumptions resulting from proof of monopoly power.7 9 In United States v.
Grinnell Corp.,80 the Supreme Court noted, but refused to decide the merits
of,"1 the express statement of this rule as set forth in the district court opinion:
[O]nce the Government has borne the burden of proving what is the relevant market
and how predominant a share of that market defendant has, it follows that there are
rebuttable presumptions that defendant has monopoly power and has monopolized in
violation of § 2. The Government need not prove . . . defendant's predatory tactics
82
While the Supreme Court went on to distinguish "the willful acquisition or
maintenance of [monopoly] power" from "superior product, business acumen,
Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979); see Innovation
Competition, supra note 10, at 304-14.
75. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); accord, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 425-26 (1956) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2,
q 624c.
76. Professor Gelhorn asks: "Is it not skill to have 'the advantage of experience,' trade
connections and 'the elite of personnel'? What is foresight if it does not include 'anticlpat[lng]
increases in the demand for ingot and be[ingl prepared to supply them' or 'embrac[ing] each new
opportunity as it opened'? And what does industry mean, if it does not cover Alcoa's investments
'doubling and redoubling its capacity'? Each of these factors was relied upon to find that Alcoa
deliberately maintained its monopoly power, yet each comes close to establishing the primary
defense also recognized in Alcoa." E. Gelhorn, Antitrust Law and Economics 150.51 (1976)
(alterations in original); 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 626(a); Turner, supra note 2, at
1218.
77. See National Commission, supra note 22, at 141.
78. See Turner, supra note 2, at 1219. According to Prof. Turner, the result in Alcoa can be
justified, even assuming the absence of exclusionary conduct, by distinguishing between the
acquisition of monopoly power and the persistent retention of monopoly over a substantial period
of time. Id.
79. See 148 F.2d at 427. "Having proved that 'Alcoa' had a monopoly of the domestic ingot
market, the plaintiff had gone far enough; if it was an excuse, that 'Alcoa' had not abused Its
power, it lay upon 'Alcoa' to prove that it had not." Id.
80. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
81. Id. at 576 n.7.
82. 236 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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or historic accident, '8 3 the Court did not have to consider these defenses due
to the presence in Grinnell of egregiously anticompetitive conduct of the type
which would violate section 1.84
Although the Court might have been requiring some tangible culpable
conduct to prove unlawful monopolization, the outcome under the Grinnell
test in any given case will be greatly influenced by which half of the test is
emphasized: "willful acquisition or maintenance" or "superior product, busi-
ness acumen, or historic accident." If too much emphasis is placed on intent
and purpose independent of unlawful acts, the standard would bear a striking
resemblance to the course of conduct approach.8 5 As such, it leaves unre-
solved many of the questions raised by Alcoa. Must a firm with monopoly
power forgo heavy investment in research and development or refrain from
expanding to meet new needs? Is a monopolist required to disclose trade
secrets or prohibited from using restrictive covenants? What constitutes an
unreasonable price reduction for a monopolist? Kodak and CalComp have
provided answers to many of these questions by setting up strict objective
tests of antitrust behavior.
1-. ECONOMIC EVIDENCE OF EXCLUSIONARY INTENT.
Kodak and CalComp suggest strict economic tests to identify the existence
of exclusionary conduct. They reject the "passive beneficiary" language in
Alcoa by noting that the contention that any act taken by a monopolist
satisfies the literal "monopolizes" language of the statute is an overly broad
one,8 6 and that acts unreasonably restrictive of competition must be proved. 87
83. 384 U.S. at 570-71.
84. Id. at 571. The conduct involved in GrinneU included pricing below cost, dismantling
competing firms, agreements among competitors to divide markets and fix prices and a domi-
nance based upon a "steady stream of acquisitions of competitive enterprises." 236 F. Supp. at
258. Thus, the district court concluded by condemning defendants conduct as per se violations:
"[T]he companies he controlled had in the most flagrant way violated the clearest aspects, the
so-called per se rules, of the Sherman Act and were continuing to follow patterns conceived in
crime." Id. at 259.
85. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), ret'd in part,
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). The distinction, in the extreme,
between an intent to gain customers by superior competitive strategies and an intent to injure
competitors is spurious; it "is about as useful as defining normal sexual conduct as that engaged in
to express love and abnormal sexual conduct as that engaged in for personal gratification."
R. Bork, supra note 25, at 38-39. A successful competitor intends the consequences of his success,
i.e. the concomitant "injury" to its rivals; such an intent cannot be unlawful by itself. Union
Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 144 (D. Mass.), modified
on other grounds, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); see 3 P. Areeda
& D. Turner, supra note 2, 626a, at 76, 822a, at 314; Turner, supra note 2, at 1219. Compare
Borden, Inc., [1979] 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CC) 21,490 at 21,503-525 (Nov. 7, 1978) (opinion of
Comm'r) with E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., [1979] 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,613 at
21,749 (Sept. 4, 1979) (Business awareness of the nature and probable results of otherwise lawful
conduct does not supply an illegal intent to monopolize).
86. 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979); [1979-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,975 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1979).
87. [1979-1] Trade Cas. 62,713, at 77,975.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
The significance of the new tests is highlighted by the fact that the courts
formulated them to evaluate the conduct of two highly-developed and well-
established monopolies. A brief outline of both cases is necessary to a
complete understanding of the objective tests for predatory conduct.
A. CalComp and Kodak
1. CalComp 18
IBM is one of the largest industrial corporations in the world,8 9 having
achieved leadership in the computer industry in the mid-1950's and thereafter
pioneering the development of many electronic data processing products. IBM
manufactures entire computer systems, including central processing units
(CPUs) and various peripheral devices. 90 Like other manufacturers, IBM
both leases and sells its computers.
CalComp manufactured various peripheral devices, primarily disk drives,
plug compatible with only IBM computers. 9' CalComp's business strategy,
like that of other plug compatible manufacturers (PCMs) was straightforward:
copy and, where possible, improve upon an IBM design. By using reverse
engineering techniques, CalComp was able to avoid the expenditures for
research and development incurred by IBM, and pass on the savings through
lower prices.
92
CalComp brought suit against IBM, alleging that IBM had adopted policies
amounting to predatory price cuts in peripherals. This allegation was rejected
because CalComp failed to adduce evidence of below cost pricing. 9 3 CalComp
further argued that IBM's price increase on CPUs shortly after its price cuts
in peripherals was an unlawful use of IBM's power in the systems market to
88. The facts and legal theories involved in CalComp are substantially the same as those in
several private treble damage actions brought by plug compatible manufacturers (PCMs) against
IBM. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed
sub noma. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 7S-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979); see In re
IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 1376 (J.P.M.L. 1974).
89. In 1978, IBM had a net income of $3.1 billion on a gross revenue of $21 billion. See Wall
St. J., Nov. 13, 1979, at 48, col. 1.
90. The CPU, or computer "mainframe," includes the essential computing hardware and
operating software, and communicates information to peripheral devices for printing, display,
storage, or other functions. Peripheral equipment, such as disks, tapes, printers, and terminals, Is
connected to the CPU to enable the data processing system to perform particular functions.
Despite the rapid growth of PCM and small business computer manufacturers, IBM still
dominates the computer systems market. See 'King Computer' Still Clobbers the Opposition,
Industry Week, June 11, 1979, at 132.
91. The peripheral products involved here were disk drives, which are devices using magnetic
disks similar to phonographic records to store information, and controllers, which are used for
communication between the disk drives and the CPU. Generally, such devices exist as external
components that may be "plugged into" IBM CPUs. [1979-1] Trade Cas. T 62,713, at 77,971.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 77,979-80. IBM's price cuts were encouraged so long as its prices remained equal to
or above marginal cost. Id. at 77,981-82. "Where the opportunity exists to increase or protect
market share profitably by offering equivalent or superior performance at a lower price, even a
virtual monopolist may do so." Id. at 77,981.
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gain a competitive advantage. This claim also failed, however, because
evidence showed that the CPU increase was not expected by IBM to be a
complete "wash" with lost revenue resulting from peripheral price reduc-
tions.94 Furthermore, there were compelling independent business justifica-
tions for the price increase, including increased manufacturing costs and
inflation. 95
IBM had also coupled its price reductions with new design changes in its
disk drive system. The changes required new CPU/peripherals interfaces
which differed significantly from previous configurations. No interface infor-
mation was predisclosed to the PCM companies, thereby inhibiting them from
competing for peripherals business until they successfully copied the new
devices and interfaces. CalComp claimed that the design changes were not
technologically justified, that the new products were inferior, and that the
changes were incorporated to frustrate PCM competition. The court, how-
ever, found a lawful attempt by IBM to compete on the basis of a "superior
product. '96 The court noted, that while there was some evidence supporting
CalComp's claim of product inferiority, the new devices were not without
advantages over the old and offered similar performance at a lower price. 9 7
The court acknowledged that a monopolist is held to a higher standard of
conduct than less powerful companies and may be liable for otherwise lawful
acts that unnecessarily exclude competition from the relevant market. 98 The
court further stated, however, that defendant's acts should be analyzed
analogously to those of multiple parties under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In an analysis reminiscent to that of Standard Oil, CalCo.mp's allegations
were rejected because IBM's acts were not "unreasonably restrictive of
competition." 99 The outcome would not have been different had the alleged
anticompetitive acts, as plaintiff insisted, been considered collectively. In an
interesting postscript to its decision, the court noted that it was required, due
94. The court found insufficient evidence to support CalComp's "subsidization" claim and
further noted that such subsidization was unnecessary since the disk products were sold at a
profit. Id. at 77,983.
95. Id.
96. In 1970, when IBM introduced its very popular System 370 Model 145, it announced the
2319A as the standard disk drive for use with the 145. The control function for the new IBM disk
drive was partially integrated into the CPU, whereas earlier disk products themselves housed the
control function. IBM's new communication controllers for the System 370 Models 158 and 168
also integrated the disk control function within the CPU. Id. at 77,982. CalComp characterized
these design changes as " 'technological manipulation' which did not improve performance." Id.
Regardless of whether it improved performance, the Model 145/2319A was found to be a lower
cost alternative and hence a superior product from the buyer's point of view. Id.
97. The court rejected CalComp's claim of nonfunctional design changes by finding some
evidence of competitive purpose: "IBM ... had the right to redesign its products to make them
more attractive to buyers-whether by reason of lower manufacturing cost and price or improved
performance. It was under no duty to help CaComp or other peripheral equipment manufactur-
ers survive or expand. IBM need not have provided its rivals with disk products to examine and
copy, nor have constricted its product development so as to facilitate sales of rival products." Id.
at 77,983 (citation omitted); see 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, '1 738, at 286.
98. [1979-1] Trade Cas. 62,713, at 77,975 (citing Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559
F.2d 488, 498 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978)).
99. Id.
1979]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
to the number of issues presented, to consider each instance of anticompetitive
"conduct separately for purposes of analytical clarity."' 0 0 The court recog-
nized, however, that" 'plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof
without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wip-
ing the slate clean after scrutiny of each.' "101 The court's language must be
read, in light of the preceding analysis, not as an endorsement of a general
course of conduct approach, but as an acknowledgment of the presumptions
in favor of the nonmoving party in considering a motion for a directed
verdict. 102
2. Kodak
Kodak is the giant of the photography industry, 10 3 dominating the man-
ufacture of still cameras, 104 film,10 - and paper used to print color pictures. 106
It also has a ten percent market share in photofinishing services. 10 7 The firm
has rivals at each stage of the photography process, but in many of them it
remains largely unchallenged.
Berkey is primarily a photofinisher, but between 1966 and 1978 it also sold
still cameras.' 08 In 1973, Berkey came out with its own 110 camera to
compete with the 110 Kodak model. Berkey made approximately eight
100. Id. at 77,984.
101. Id. (quoting Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699
(1962)).
102. Id. at 77,972-74; see Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 699 (1962); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 278-79 (2d Cir. 1979)
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427).
103. 603 F.2d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept.
14, 1979) (No. 79-427). In 1977 Kodak had sales of nearly $6 billion and pre-tax profits In excess
of $1.2 billion. Id.
104. The "amateur conventional still camera" market consists almost entirely of the 110 and
126 instant-loading cameras. Between 1954 and 1973 Kodak never enjoyed less than 64% of the
dollar volume; in the peak year of 1964, Kodak cameras accounted for 90% of market revenues.
The court pointed out that this success was "no doubt due to the firm's history of innovation." Id.
at 269.
105. Kodak's position in the film market is even stronger than its hold on cameras. Since
1952, its annual sales in film have never been lower than 82% of the nationwide volume on a unit
basis, and 88% in revenues. Kodak's trial counsel told the jury in his summation that " 'the film
market ... has been a market where there has not been price competition and where Kodak has
been able to price its products pretty much without regard to the products of competitors.' " Id. at
270.
106. While Kodak's market power in the color paper market fell from 94% in 1968 to 67% In
1975, its earnings relative to sales remained virtually constant, averaging 60% for the period. Id.
at 271. 1
107. Before 1954, Kodak had a nearly absolute monopoly over the color photofinishing
market. With over 95% of color film sales, Kodak sold every roll with an advance charge for
processing included. The film/processing "tie-in" resulted in a consent decree in 1954; the Justice
Department required Kodak to make its processing technology and materials available to rivals at
reasonable rates. Thus, Kodak's share of the processing market plummeted from 96% in 1954, to
17% in 1970, and reached a low of 10% by 1976. Id. at 270-71.
108. Berkey's entry into the still camera market dates to its 1966 acquisition of Keystone
Camera Company. Berkey accounted for 8.2% of the sales in the camera market during the
period of 1970-1977, with a peak of 10.2% in 1976. In 1978, Berkey abandoned this market when
it sold its camera division. Id. at 269-70.
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percent of such camera sales during the complaint period, and sued Kodak for
monopolizing the camera and film markets by acts that cost Berkey greater
sales in the market. The Second Circuit reversed the jury verdict in Berkey's
favor. 109
The focal point of Berkey's claim was Kodak's introduction in 1972 of the
110 camera system. 110 The 110 was a smaller version of the earlier Instama-
tics, capable of producing photographs as clear and as large as larger
cameras. At the time the development program was initiated in the early
1960's, Kodak personnel considered existing film "quite adequate" for use
with the proposed 110 camera. In 1967, however, Kodak decided to develop a
new film and photofinishing process, despite concern that these new products
might adversely affect competing photofinishers who had no access to the new
process."' Two years later, it was decided that the introduction of the new
film and finishing process should coincide with the introduction in 1972 of the
110 camera in order to increase the marketability of the entire system.
The Second Circuit did not question the district court's finding of monopoly
power in the camera and film markets. Berkey challenged the introduction of
the Kodak 110 camera system as an illegal attempt to leverage Kodak's
109. 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427).
110. With respect to Berkey's claims concerning Kodak's introduction of the 110 photographic
system, the court noted that the "factors present here are representative of the case as a whole."
603 F.2d at 276. Berkey also claimed to have been injured as a result of lost photofinishing
profits, of overcharges paid for Kodak photofinishing equipment, id. at 290-92, and of over-
charges paid for Kodak film and color print paper. Id. at 293-98. The court reversed and
remanded for retrial on the photofinishing claims, suggesting that Kodak's refusal to supply its
competitors with photofinishing supplies in bulk might have been an unlawful refusal to deal.
The court noted, however, that "the purpose of the Sherman Act... is not to maintain friendly
business relations among firms in the same industry nor was it designed to keep these firms happy
and gleeful." Id. at 291 (citations omitted). The court also reversed the film and color print paper
damage-awards, ruling that Judge Franke's jury instructions on damage were in error. -Thljury
had been instructed that Kodak, if found to have monopolized the markets in question, was fully
liable for the entire excess of the monopoly price over the competitive price. The Second Circuit,
rejecting this "competitive price" rule, held that a monopolist is liable only for the price increment
that is reasonably attributable to its wrongful conduct. Id. at 296-98. Proof of causation between
a price overcharge and defendant's actionable behavior is extremely difficult to establish, and
plaintiff should perhaps be given the benefit of the doubt on close questions. 3 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, supra note 2, T, 630, at 98. The requisite causation will generally be inferred from proof
of some injury flowing from unlawful acts. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
143-44 (1968) (White, J., concurring); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690, 702 (1962). Plaintiff need only show that the unlawful conduct was a "material
cause" of plaintiff's injury, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. at 123-24,
not that it was the only or most substantial cause. Weimer Co. v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 428 F.2d
726, 729 (7th Cir. 1970); Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader Corp., 33 F.2d 795, 806 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
111. 603 F.2d at 277. One Kodak scientist saw "no need" for a new film, believing that it
"'would raise hell in the photofinishing business, would do little to decrease the cost of the
operation, 'and that the ultimate customer would not benefit.' " Id. at 277 n.16. The same
scientist feared an " 'unethical' attempt to create a 'deliberate... incompatibility with systems
other than Kodacolor.' " Id. at 277 (footnote omitted).
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monopoly power in film into the camera, photofinishing services, and equip-
ment markets. 112 Essentially, Berkey advanced three arguments with respect
to the 110 system introduction: first, that because Kodak set de facto stan-
dards for the photography industry, it had a special duty to refrain from
surprise innovations, and was required to make adequate predisclosure to
enable rivals to stay competitive with it; 113 second, that the introduction of
Kodacolor H as part of the 110 system was not technically necessary for the
new camera 1 4 and was instead a use of Kodak's monopoly power in film to
gain a competitive advantage in cameras; and finally, that limiting Kodacolor
112. Id. at 282. In United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), the Supreme Court held
that a firm with lawful monopolies of motion-picture exhibition in towns too small to support
more than one movie theater violated § 2 when it used the leverage conferred by the monopolies
to obtain advantageous terms from motion picture distributors in larger towns in which it faced
competition. Id. at 107-09. Grifith has been read to the effect that it may also be an "abuse" of
monopoly power and a violation of § 2 to use that power to tamper in markets related
horizontally or vertically to the market monopolized. See 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2,
626f, at 82-83. Presumably, then, under the Griffith doctrine, lawful monopolies may be held
liable under § 2 for using the leverage conferred by a legal monopoly, e.g., patent protection, to
gain a competitive advantage in another product cri geographic market.
Unlawful leveraging may be found where a practice is accompanied by coercive use of
monopoly power. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275-76 (2d Cir.
1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427). This latter
rule strongly links two-market conduct under § 2 to tying arrangements under § 1, Id. at 275-76.
Firms with substantial power over one product are prohibited from tying the sale to that of
another product. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayne
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947); Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 838 (1978) (defendant misused monopoly power when it linked the purchase of
competitive drugs to drugs over which it had a valid monopoly); see Bowman, Tying Arrange-
ments and the Leveraging Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19 (1957). Coercion is most often found when a
monopolist refuses to deal with firms which need the monopolist's products to effectively
compete. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927). For a thorough review of the law on
refusals to deal by a monopolist, see Andrew Byars v. Bluff City News Co., No. 17-1227, slip op.
at 19-35 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1979). See also 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 725-726;
Note, Refusals to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1720 (1974).
113. Kodak, with a monopoly in both film and cameras, "was in a position to set industry
standards. Rivals could not compete effectively without offering products similar to Kodak's."
603 F.2d at 279. Throughout the 1960's, Kodak had selectively disclosed as "a matter of
judgment" innovations to competitors to ensure that the industry could meet the demand for
complementary goods and services required by new Kodak products. Although it initially
intended not to distribute plans of the 110 system, Kodak agreed to limited disclosure for a fee
under pressure of threatened litigation. Berkey paid $60,000 for less than two months advance
knowledge of the 110 plans; this notice was far from adequate to permit Berkey to have its own
products ready when the 110 was introduced. Id. at 279-81.
114. Id. at 279. To meet the introduction deadline, several problems with the new film,
Kodacolor U, remained unresolved. The new film was grainier than had been anticipated,
although it was still considered superior in that respect to Kodacolor X---d..t 278 n.17.
Moreover, it had a shorter shelf life than its developers expected, and was\dively vertsed
as having a shelflife more than twice as long as it actually had. Id. at 288n.71.
1979] SECTION 2 CONDUCT REQUIREMENT
11 to the 110 format unlawfully foreclosed competition by other manufacturers
in existing formats.1
5
In rejecting Berkey's claims, the Second Circuit endorsed the view that a
monopolist is "encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively on the merits.""16
The court agreed that introduction of the Kodacolor 11/110 camera system
was part of a plan by which Kodak sought to use its combined film and
camera capabilities to bolster faltering camera sales. None of Kodak's acts,
however, were unreasonably restrictive of competition; they merely rep-
resented "superior products" and the "process of invention and innova-
tion."11 7 Most significant is the fact that the Kodak court expressly rejected
the broad reading of Alcoa.118
B. Application of Objective Tests to Particular Business Practices.
Kodak and CalComp have extended the once extraordinary defense in favor
of skill, foresight and industry to ordinary business practices by creating a
presumption that such practices are procompetitive. Plaintiffs bear a substan-
tial burden of proving willful maintenance of monopoly power through
anticompetitive acts which do not have legitimate business justifications.
Under this approach, examination of a monopolist's conduct generally ends in
its favor, without inquiry into intent, if a given price reduction results in a
profit," 9 if a product innovation incorporates a price or performance im-
provement, 20 if a marketing practice reduces costs and prices,12 1 or if sales
and marketing practices in general are common to the industry. 22
115. For 18 months after the 110 system was introduced, Kodacolor II was produced only in
the 110 format. Because no other firm as yet had a 110 on the market, thereby compelling
consumers who wished to use the "remarkable new film" to buy a Kodak camera, Berkey claimed
it lost camera sales. The court conceded that the restriction of the new film to the 110 format
without legitimate justification might be an unlawful use of monopoly power in one market to
foreclose competitors in another. The court held, however, that Berkey failed to establish more
than de minimus injury. Id. at 288-89; see notes 174-204 itnfra and accompanying text.
116. 603 F.2d at 281.
117. Id. at 281, 286-87.
118. Id. at 273-74.
119. California Computer Prods. Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) c 62,713, at
77,981-82 (9th Cir. 1979); Transamnerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at
50 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979); see pt. II (B)(1) infra.
120. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,286-87 (2d Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed sub nor.
Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979); see pt. 11 (B)t2)
infra.
121. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); California Computer Prods.,
Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,981 (9th Cir. 1979). Some
practices merely reflect efficiencies in production, marketing, and distribution, which are encour-
aged rather than condemned by the antitrust laws. Hence, a large firm does not violate § 2 by
merely enjoying the competitive advantages afforded by integrated corporate structure--"more
efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary products, reduced transaction
costs, and so forth." 603 F.2d at 276.
122. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 925 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975). A monopolist is permitted to meet competitive threats with any ordinary marketing
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1. Pricing Behavior
One of the persistent problems in the area of single market monopolization
is the extent to which a monopolist may reduce prices in response to
competitive challenges to its dominant market share. 1 23 When a dominant
firm charges higher than competitive prices it creates a "price umbrella" under
which competitors prosper, thereby inducing new entry into the market. 124 At
some point, the dominant firm will be compelled to lower its prices to
recapture lost sales revenue. By consciously planning to recapture eroding
market power, the monopolist, under the Alcoa standard, is deliberately
maintaining monopoly power in violation of section 2.12S
Proof of below cost, or "predatory," pricing under the Alcoa view is not
necessary. To condemn price reductions as such, however, would be a
disincentive for monopolists to engage in vigorous price competition. Hence,
the circuit court in CalComp agreed that IBM had a right, as has any
company, "to respond to the lower prices of its competitors with reduced, but
still substantially profitable, prices on its own products."'1 26 The court held
that, below cost pricing is per se unlawful, and that above cost pricing is
protected by a presumption of legality. 127 Such an objective test is required so
as not to discourage or punish aggressive price competition, thereby avoiding
an "ill-advised reversal of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the
Sherman Act is meant to protect the competitive process, not competitors.' 128
In effect, the exception created by Grinnell in favor of "business acumen" has
been expanded to include "shrewdness in profitable price competition.' 129
CalComp adopted the Areeda and Turner approach to predatory pricing. 130
methods common to the industry, so long as the success of its practice or policy does not depend
on monopoly power for its success. Id. at 927.
123. See generally 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 9 710-722; Predatory Pricing,
supra note 2.
124. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1979),
petition for cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); California Computer
Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,978-79 (9th Cir. 1979);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 46-47 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
18, 1979).
125. E.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd 510 F.2d
894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Borden, Inc., [1979] 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 21,490, at 21,502, 21,506-510 (opinion of Comm'n), 21,517-524 (concurring opinion of
Comm'r Pitofsky), (Nov. 7, 1979); see note 85 supra.
126. [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 62,713, at 77,980 (9th Cir. 1979).
127. Id. at 77,980-82.
128. Id. at 77,980.
129. Id. at 77,981.
130. 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 711-15; Predatory Pricing, supra note 2.
Pricing below short-run marginal costs or average variable costs of production are conclusively
presumed unlawful under the Areeda and Turner view. 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2
1 711(d), at 153-54; Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 712. Areeda and Turner's cost-based
standard for defining illegal predatory practices has been criticized. R. Posner, supra note 2, at
184-96; Greer, A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory Practices, 24 Antitrust
Bull. 233 (1979); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
869 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284
(1977). The Areeda and Turner standard was considered and rejected by the National Commis-
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1979] SECTION 2 CONDUCT REQUIREMENT
A price is considered predatory if it is below short-run marginal costs, 131 or as
surrogate, average variable costs, of production.' 32 Firms, monopolists in-
cluded, are encouraged to engage in aggressive price competition, reducing
prices to the point of marginal costs. 1 33 This price level is the "competitive
and socially optimal result," 134 and will ordinarily cause only the elimination
of less efficient competitors.13S
It is not clear to what extent, if any, prices above marginal costs may be
deemed, in light of other circumstances, exclusionary. 136 Some courts have
held that a prima facie case for section 2 cannot be established without proof
of below cost pricing. 137 CalComp may not go that far. The court, following
sion to Review Antitrust Laws and Procedures. National Commission, supra note 2, at 149-51,
165-66; see Fox, In Defense of the Nati. Comm.'s Attempt-to-Monopolie Amendment, Nat'l L.J.,
May 14, 1979, at 24, col. 1.
131. "Marginal cast" is defined as the cost to produce one more unit of output. See Janich
Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 857 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 829 (1978); 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, T 712, at 155. The "short run" is defined
as "the period in which the firm cannot replace or increase plant equipment." Id. 712, at
155-56.
132. "Average variable cast" is defined as "the sum of all variable costs divided by output." 3
P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 712, at 155; see Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling
Co., 570 F.2d 848, 858 n.11 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978). One notable
difference between the 1975 and 1978 versions, both discussed supra note 2, of the predatory
pricing standards espoused by Areeda and Turner, is that under their latter version average
variable cost can substitute for short-run marginal cost only when accounting records do not
permit determination of marginal cost. 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 911 7 l5c-7 lSd. The
court in Janich Bros. held that "[a]verage variable cost is likely to approximate marginal cost."
570 F.2d at 858 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). Similarly, Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541
F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977), determined that "because
marginal cost is often impossible to ascertain" average variable cost was a sufficient judicial
substitute.
133. [1979-1] Trade Cas. $ 62,713, at 77,981; see 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2,
711-722; Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 709-16.
134. Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 711.
135. [1979-1] Trade Cas. $ 62,713, at 77,981 (citing Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling
Co., 570 F.2d 848, 857 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978), and Hanson v. Shell
Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977)).
136. While pricing below average variable or short-run marginal costs is clearly per se
unlawful, the legal consequences of pricing above that level are still unclear. In their 197S article,
Professors Areeda and Turner suggested that pricing conduct should be conclusively presumed
legal if price levels exceeded either defendant's average variable cost or defendant's short-run
marginal cost. Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 733. In their 1978 treatise; Areeda & Turner
concluded that such pricing should only be presumed legal. P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2,
T 711(d), at 154. Following Areeda & Turner's 1978 approach, the courts in CalComp and ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed
sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979), protected
above marginal cost pricing with a presumption of legality. Neither court, however, adequately
defined the type of evidence which would rebut such a presumption.
137. Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-S9 & n.6 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). The charge in both cases was an attempt to monopolize
based solely on predatory pricing claims. The standard may be less severe in actual monopoliza-
tion cases where there is some evidence of other associated anticompetitive conduct. Trans-
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Areeda and Turner, suggests that predation may be found where the
monopolist sets his prices below his short-run profit-maximizing rate, al-
though they remain above marginal cost. 138 In a market with high barriers,
the monopolist might be required to keep his prices high enough to induce
entry. 139 Nevertheless, the circuit courts in CalComp and Telex Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 140 a case with a similar fact pattern, appear to insulate above cost
pricing from further scrutiny. Although both court* only created a presump-
tion that pricing above marginal costs is lawful, 14' neither court suggested the
type of evidence, if any, required to rebut the presumption. The court in
Telex expressly refused to look beyond the acts involved to the substantial
america Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 44-45 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18,
1979).
138. [1979-1] Trade Cas. 62,713, at 77,981. The court recognized "that refinement of tile
marginal or average variable cost test will be necessary as future cases arise. For instance, limit
pricing by a monopolist might, on a record which presented the issue, be held an impermissible
predatory practice." Id. The court goes on, however, to enumerate two instances in which pricing
should not be given to a jury for consideration: 1) "substantial proof that (the] price cuts were
highly profitable" and 2) evidence that the "reductions were a response to lower-priced competi-
tion." Id. at 77,982.
139. P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 711-722; see Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at
733. Limit pricing, that is, pricing below the monopolist's short-run profit maximizing price, has
yet to be successfully attacked as predatory. This may reflect a reluctance by courts to condemn
monopolists for not keeping its prices high enough, or it may merely reflect the administrative
difficulties of policing such price behavior. See 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 714b, at
160-61. In International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (Sth Cir.
1975), the Fifth Circuit recognized the possibility of predation where a monopolist charges a price
below its short-run profit-maximizing price. This standard, which might find predation when the
monopolist's price is above its average costs, should be applied "only when the barriers to entry
are extremely high." Id. at 724-25 n.31. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the possibility of
unlawful limit pricing in Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977), but noted with reservation that "[tihere is some question whether
[limit pricing] should be considered predatory: it only discourages inefficient new entrants who
must have higher prices to survive." Id. In California Computer Prods. Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
[1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,981 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit again
acknowledged that the marginal cost standard requires further "refinement," and that limit
pricing might on other facts be held unlawful. The latest refinement of the marginal cost standard
adopts an average total cost standard for predatory pricing and appears to reject any possibility of
unlawful limit pricing above the point of total costs. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp.,
No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 50 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979). All pricing above that level is protected
by a conclusive presumption of legality despite the existence of significant entry barriers. Id.
Memorex bases a large part of its appeal to the Ninth Circuit on their limit pricing claims; a
clearer statement of the status of limit pricing awaits the Ninth Circuit's decision. Brief for
Appellant, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
appeal docketed sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-3050, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1,
1979).
140. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
141. California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,713, at
77,982 ("[,Vle do not foreclose the possibility that a monopolist who reduces prices to some point
above marginal or average variable costs might still be held to have engaged in a predatory act
because of other aspects of its conduct." (emphasis added)); accord, Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
510 F.2d at 926.
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evidence of specific intent to destroy rivals.1 4 2 Both courts refused to infer a
general intent to monopolize from allegations of an unlawful course of
conduct. 143
The objective standard of predatory pricing proposed by Areeda and
Turner, and embraced enthusiastically by several courts, is incomplete. 144
The Areeda and Turner analysis only accounts for the short-run 4s and fails
to consider the strategy behind pricing decisions. 146 There are strong implica-
tions of unreasonable conduct restricting competition, "[i]f a monopolist, in
response to actual or threatened entry into a previously controlled market,"
reduces its price below its total costs but above short-run marginal costs. ' 4 7 In
Telex, for example, there was evidence that IBM timed its otherwise lawful
142. 510 F.2d at 926-28. The district court found numerous business justifications for IBM's
price cuts and leasing policy that, although "convincing under different circumstances, [arel
overpowered by IBM's monopoly position ... and the rather clear indication that [IBM's] action
was directed not at competition in an appropriate competitive sense but at competitors and their
viability as such." 367 F. Supp. 258, 299 (N.D. Okla. 1973), reVtd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
143. The court of appeals in Telex acknowledged the substantial evidence that IBM planned
its response to make it more difficult for Telex to refinance its leasing operations, but gave it little
weight. 510 F.2d at 928; see note 38 supra. The court held that IBM's response was reasonable
since its prices were still profitable and represented ordinary marketing methods available to
others in the market. 510 F.2d at 928. Similarly, the court in CalComp, while conceding the
possibility that profitable pricing might still be predatory because of other aspects of IBM's
conduct, did not find predatory practices on the basis of evidence of design changes or offsetting
price increases for CPUs. [1979-1] Trade Cas. 62,713, at 77,983.
144. See note 130 supra.
145. The more relevant inquiry is into a firm's long-run marginal costs, since a "predator
operates strategically in the long run." Greer, supra note 130, at 243. Because reliable estimates of
long-run marginal costs are almost always unavailable, average total costs may serve as a
"reasonable but admittedly imperfect surrogate." Id. at 244-45; see Transamerica Computer Co.
v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 41-43 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979) (adoption of a total
average cost test for predatory pricing).
146. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73,1832, slip op. at 53-55 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 18, 1979); Greer, supra note 130, at 240-41; Scherer, supra note 130, at 883-90;
Williamson, supra note 130, at 291. The distinction between the long-run purpose and effect of
competitive behavior as opposed to its short-run effect, was recognized early by Judge Hand in
United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S.
621 (1919): "While the [Sherman Act] . . . relies upon competition as a proper stimulus to the
maintenance of industrial advance and as the chief protection to the consumer, it takes a long
view, not a short. It recognizes that with the customer in the end must lie the decision between
producers, and that those who fail to secure the market by the quality and cost of their service
must pass out of the field; but it does not identify permanent capacity with the inability to endure
a transitory or local appeal to customers. Its presupposition is that there may well be competitors
capable in the end of giving a service which will serve the public as well as their neighbors, who
may yet succumb to concerted competition apparently more serviceable, but only because it is
temporary .... [N]early all the devices condemned by the courts contain this sporadic element,
either of time or place; that is to say, that they cover only a competition which was not intended
to be permanent, and which the combination knew was only for the temporary purpose of
extirpating a competitor who had at least some chance in the long run of establishing a service
which would be as acceptable as any within the power of the combination itself." Id. at 1012-13.
147. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 43 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 18, 1979).
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price reductions on peripheral equipment to reduce its competitors' revenues
when the competitors were most vulnerable. 148 Such evidence would appear
to be relevant to the purpose for which IBM adopted its price reductions: to
compete on the merits for increased sales or to harm the financial stability and
therefore the viability of specific competitors. Protecting the pricing behavior
with a conclusive presumption of legality allows established monopolists the
freedom to eliminate equally or more efficient rivals from the market even if
the monopolist's purpose is exclusionary. 145,
The theory that pricing at or above marginal cost will only eliminate less
efficient firms is not in all cases true. 150 The marginal cost theory does not
account for different "structures of cost."'' 1 Consider a small firm which has
recently entered a market, induced by the high price umbrella of the domi-
nant firm. A small firm may have substantially lower fixed costs than the
larger established firm, but may also have significantly higher variable costs
of production. 15 2 Thus, although total costs for the smaller firm might be the
same or even less than those of the dominant firm, it still can be priced out of
the market by prices set at or above the dominant firm's average variable
cost.
148. IBM's competitive response to PCM competition was initiated after IBM management
had made several detailed studies of the peripherals market, of how its own market share could
be increased, and of the competitive vulnerability of it, rivals. 510 F.2d 894, 921. In 1970, an
IBM task force was established which studied in detail the products, financial condition,
management, and general viability of its competitors in the market. The task force concluded that
Telex was in a vulnerable financial position, that its cash flow was inadequate to refinance Its
own lease base, and that IBM could exploit that vulnerability by sharp price cuts and increased
leasing of its own equipment. 367 F. Supp. 258, 294-95 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894
(10th Cir. 1975). The district court also found that IBM reduced its price on memory products
and increased prices on CPUs "with the primary purpose of creating barriers to entry for potential
plug compatible memory competitors." Id. at 304.
149. The court of appeals in Telex reversed the district court's decision, holding that because
IBM's price reductions were not below cost, it could not be liable for violating § 2 even If Its
purpose was to destroy Telex. The court rejected the trial court's inference of monopolistic intent
from the conclusions of the IBM task forces and the subjective intent of management. 5 10 F. 2d at
928; see note 148 supra. The court expanded the "thrust upon" defense to include any voluntary,
as well as involuntary, act by a monopolist to preserve or expand its monopoly power, so long as
the act is an "ordinary business practice" which does not depend upon the existence of monopoly
power for its success. 510 F.2d at 925-26.
150. Courts adopting the Areeda and Turner standard have not always acknowledged Its
potential anticompetitive effect. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-11
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713, at 77,981 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[Only less efficient firms will be
disadvantaged" by a marginal cost standard); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977) (only the less efficient are threatened by a marginal
cost rule); International Air Indus. Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976) (equally efficient firms may be driven out of business by
marginal cost pricing); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1060 n.16 (D.N.J. 1977) (equally
efficient firms may be threatened by marginal cost pricing, but more efficient rivals are safe).
151. Scherer, supra note 31, at 5.
152. Id. at 70. The author would like to express his appreciation to Barbara Epstein, an
economist with Horace J. De Podwin Associates, New York, for her insights into the implications
of differing "cost structures" on a predatory pricing standard based on average variable costs. See
B. Epstein, Politics of Trade in Power Plant 110-11 (1971).
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As an illustration, the court in Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp. 3
found that IBM's marginal costs were as little as fifty percent of its average
costs. 15 4 The court pointed out that, as a result, IBM had the ability to
destroy rivals who were twice as efficient in terms of average costs simply
because IBM "had a bigger bankroll."155 Under these circumstances,
"[e]fficiency is no longer the sole determinant of survival;" once price falls
below the monopolist's total cost, a rival firm's staying power in terms of cash
reserves becomes paramount.156 A better test, then, is one based on total, or
"full cost. 15 7 Because pricing below that level but above short-run marginal
is excusable under certain circumstances, 5 8 evidence of such pricing behavior
should be coupled with a limited inquiry into its intent or purpose.' 5 9
Monopolists condemned under the marginal cost test are almost certainly
genuine predators, and therefore monopolistic intent need not be examined. ' 60
But the test is too lenient: while it avoids "branding sheep as wolves," it is
subject to "mistaking wolves for sheep."' 61 Insulating all pricing above
marginal cost from antitrust scrutiny would be a "defendant's paradise."'
62
The test tends to see innocence where guilt may be present; and more
importantly, it involves a general rejection of evidence that is relevant if not
indispensable to an accurate determination of predatory conduct, that is,
evidence of predatory intent.
Hence, where the alleged conduct is ambiguous, it is essential to consider
the effect and purpose of the pricing behavior. 163 Intent has always played a
153. No. C 73-1832 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979).
154. Id., slip op. at 51.
155. Id. Areeda & Turner, in discussing their cost-based standard of predation, acknowledge
the possibility that an equally efficient rival may be eliminated from a market or prevented from
entering it if a monopolist is permitted to price at his marginal costs. Predatory Pricing, supra
note 2, at 710. They consider this result, though "not a happy one," justified because of the heavy
administrative burden entailed in policing temporary price cuts without unduly hindering valid
price competition. 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 714c, at 161. They do not, however,
acknowledge the possibility that a more efficient firm could be destroyed.
156. No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 50.
157. "Total cost" is the sum of fixed and total variable costs. Total cost divided by output is
average cost, or "full cost." 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 'r 712, at 155.
158. Prices below total cost might be reasonable, for example, if the monopolist was merely
liquidating its excess or obsolete merchandise. Williamson, supra note 130, at 317-18. Less than
full cost pricing might be justified if reduced demand forced the monopolist to minimize losses by
selling at the best price the market offered. R. Posner, supra note 2, at 193.
159. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 59 (N.D. Cal.
Oct 18, 1979). Contemporaneous evidence of intent in these circumstances may be appropriate to
help characterize the nature of the acts taken: "whether [the monopolist] thought it was cutting
losses or cutting throats." Id. at 60.
160. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
161. Greer, supra note 130, at 239; see National Commission, supra note 22, at 149-50.
(Recommendation of a more flexible analytical approach "especially as it applies to conduct
by a firm with a dominant market position"). Id. at 149.
162. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 57 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 18, 1979) (citing Williamson, supra note 130, at 305).
163. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 288 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); see note 14 supra.
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central role under section 2;164 it can be shown by a wide variety of economic
and noneconomic evidence. To avoid condemning legitimate and desired price
reductions, however, the requisite showing must be "substantial."165 It can be
inferred, for example, by evidence that the conduct was coercive or unusu-
al,166 or by evidence that the monopolist increased prices immediately after
regaining its dominant position. 167
2. Design Changes
A dominant firm which produces a product in its monopoly market, as well
as complementary accessories which must be compatible with the main
product, exercises a great deal of control over the complementary markets. ' 68
IBM, for example, developed its products on a system basis, and selected
design alternatives which would enhance the commercial attractiveness of
other IBM products. 169 Kodak conceded that it marketed Kodacolor II
simultaneously with the new 110 Instamatic in part to help bolster faltering
camera sales and increase the marketability of the entire system. 170 In finding
in favor of the multiproduct monopolist, Kodak and CalComp rely in part on
the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Griffith:17 1 a firm has
unlawfully monopolized if it uses its monopoly power in one market to
foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage or destroy a competitor in
different markets. 172 Conduct, therefore, violates section 2 when monopoly
power is a necessary condition for its use. 17 3
Kodak and CalComp hold that a competitor cannot complain of product
164. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911); see note 37 supra.
165. See Greer, supra note 130, at 245.
166. Courts have only recently delineated objective standards of predatory pricing; earlier
courts had generally settled upon proof of intent plus pricing below average total cost. See, e.g.,
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Corn Prods. Ref.
Co., 234 F. 964, 1013-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919); cf. Trans-
america Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 43 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979)
(strong implications that prices below average total cost are unreasonable).
167. See Greer, supra note 130, at 247-50. Other indicia of intent suggested by Greer
include, inter alia, "long-term business plans of injurious price-cutting activity .... [plenetrating
studies of the victims' financial weaknesses and staying power under adverse price circumstances
.... [i]nitiating price cuts below average total cost and holding to those below cost prices for a
considerable time span." Id. at 248 (footnote omitted).
168. Such power by itself is not condemned, because it merely reflects competitive advantages
afforded by a vertically-integrated corporate structure. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14,
1979) (No. 79-427); see Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 157
(1954).
169. California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-Il Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,713,
at 77,982-83 (9th Cir. 1979).
170. 603 F.2d at 285.
171. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
172. Id. at 107.
173. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 6C3 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
510 F.2d 894, 926-27 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Transamerica Computer
Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979); see note 112 supra.
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introduction or change simpliciter. 174 Rather than being exclusionary, the
ability to innovate and develop superior products is regarded as a natural
result of integration, 17S and an essential element of lawful competition. 176
Nevertheless, new product introductions are not ipso facto immune from
antitrust scrutiny, but a finding that a monopolist is unreasonably tying the
sale of one product to another is not made unless substantial coercion over
consumers is present. 177 Doubts about the technical deficiencies of the inno-
vation does not by itself evidence an intent to monopolize, nor does it provide
the element of coercion. 178 Rather, the test of the reasonableness of a product
introduction is its success in the marketplace. 179
In CalComp, for example, the court refused to question business or en-
gineering decisions as long as the product in question had enjoyed some
success in the market and at least some consumers believed the new or
redesigned products offered some price or performance improvement.180 The
court concluded that IBM's new disk drive system, which was less expensive
than the old, satisfied a legitimate consumer preference in terms of price and
performance. These two criteria were not considered separately, because the
court found that an equivalent product at a lower price represents to
customers a "superior product.""8 Hence, the design changes introduced by
IBM were regarded as a genuine technological innovation, rather than an
attempt at impairing or destroying competition in the plug-compatible mar-
ket.
In Kodak, Berkey demonstrated that the Kodacolor II film was not
necessary to bring the new 110 camera to market. Moreover, there was
evidence that the new film was in some ways inferior to the old. 18 2 Both facts,
it was argued, tended to show that the film was introduced with the 110
174. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d at 286. The court stated that
"it is not the product introduction itself, but some associated conduct, that supplies the violation."
Id. at 286 n.30 (emphasis added). The court appears to require some actionable conduct
associated with the product introduction, for example, an unlawful tie-in or refusal to deal.
175. Id. at 276, 283.
176. Id. at 286.
177. Id. at 286 n.30, 287. When, however, consumers have a viable alternative in other
products, the question whether a product is "superior" can only be inferred from the reaction of
the market. Id. Success in the marketplace is a reliable barometer of "superior products" only so
long as the monopolist does not exercise coercion over customers. Id. at 287.
178. Id. at 286-87. The technological desirability of a product change-its relative quality-is
relevant to the question of monopolistic intent only when an inference of coercion exists. Id. at
287 n.39; see Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir.
1976).
179. 603 F.2d at 287.
180. [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCII) ' 62,713, at 77,982-83 (9th Cir. 1979).
181. Id. at 77,982. It would appear that a monopolist could redesign its products with the
purpose of excluding competition by merely offering an equivalent function at a lower price.
Even where there is a dispute over the quality of the design change, some courts have suggested
that no inquiry into intent should be made and the design change should be presumed legal.
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d at 287; ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v,
IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed sub nonm. Memorex Corp.
v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
182. See notes 114, 177-78 supra and accompanying text.
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camera solely to tie the sales of cameras to Kodak's powerful position in the
film market. Furthermore, Berkey alleged that a monopolist has a duty to
give its competitors in the complementary market advance knowledge of
design changes in primary products, so that the competitors can be "at the
starting line" when the new product is introduced.18 3
The district court's treatment of these claims was a clear application of the
course of conduct approach. 18 4 The court reluctantly allowed the "possibly
difficult, but seemingly appropriate" question of the relative character of the
new product to go to the jury.' 8 s The jury was cautioned that it did not sit to
second-guess business judgments as such, and that the quality of Kodacolor II
was not a concern "for its own sake.' 8 6 The quality, however, was consid-
ered to "cast light on whether the securing of monopoly power in the camera
market was a natural and innocent business development or the kind of
willful acquisition condemned by Grinnell.'' l8 7 Similarly, under the district
court analysis, failure by a monopolist to predisclose in light of some unspec-
ified associated conduct may be an exclusionary course of conduct 88 despite
the fact that nondisclosure is a reasonable method of competition. ' 8 9 Appar-
ently, the associated conduct may be some unrelated anticompetitive acts or
intent, or merely the cumulative effect of all of plaintiff's evidence. 190
Although it is not clear what other conduct the jury considered in finding the
unlawful course of conduct,' 91 Berkey had.argued that Kodak forfeited its
right to innovate without predisclosure by previously refusing to supply its
camera competitors with the film formats on economical terms. 192 Thus, the
183. 603 F.2d at 285.
184. 457 F. Supp. 404, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). The
district court acknowledged that its instructions to the jury reflected "a direct application of the
principles of Alcoa and United Shoe." Id.
185. Id. at 416.
186. Id. at 416 n.12.
187. Id. at 416.
188. 603 F.2d at 281 (citing the district court's instruction to the jury); see note 16 supra.
189. 603 F.2d at 281.
190. One commentator has characterized judicial approaches to the specific intent required in
attempt cases as falling into one of three categories: 1) the legitimate purpose approach, 2) the
unfairness approach, and 3) the gestalt approach. Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize-Specific Intent
as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1121, 1137 (1973). Under the "gestalt
approach," practices from which intent is to be inferred are admitted into evidence and submitted
to the jury with broad instructions defining unlawful intent as an intent to acquire monopoly
power or to destroy a competitor. Id. at 1146. The jury may infer unlawful intent "from all the
practices viewed as a whole, without any discussion or examination of each individual practice or
activity." Id. at 1147. The gestalt approach presents no less a problem in cases of actual
monopolization, where courts instruct juries to consider the evidence in light of concepts like
"honestly industrial," "exclusionary," and "anticompetitive." See Malina, Recent Developments in
Monopolization Litigation, 47 A.B.A. Antitrust L.J. 1135 (1979).
191. The court of appeals stated that "the better practice [in such a complex jury case] would
have been to require special verdicts or the submission of interrogatories ... pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 49." 603 F.2d at 279. Review of the case was made difficult by the court's lack of
knowledge of the precise jury findings on several specic issues. The court did not express Its
view on whether such actions may be too complex to be tried to a jury. Id, at 279 n.20.
192. 603 F.2d at 284-85.
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jury might have inferred the duty to disdose from Kodak's alleged past refusal
to deal with competitors in the camera market.
193
The Court of Appeals rejected the course of conduct approach and conclud-
ed that inquiry into the merits of the product in question is generally
useless. 194 The court further held that withholding from others advance
knowledge of one's new product is presumed lawful, rebutted only by
convincing evidence that predisclosure is the only remedy for some present
and related anticompetitive conduct. ' 95 The imposition of these objective
standards was necessary to prevent the "sluggishness the Sherman Act was
designed to prevent;" 19 6 any success achieved through the process of invention
and innovation should clearly be encouraged.197 The ability to introduce new
products without predisclosure is "a benefit of integration and not, without
more, a use of [the monopolist's] power in the [main] market to gain a
competitive advantage in [the complementary one]."'198 The "lead time"
advantage over competitors is an acceptable incentive for the monopolist. 199
Moreover, failure to use objective standards to govern product innovation
results in great uncertainty. The court reasoned that it is difficult to conceive
of conditions under which a business, making research and development
decisions, would possess the "omniscience" to anticipate all instances in which
a jury might retrospectively conclude that predisclosure was warranted. The
court found it equally difficult to discern workable guidelines to aid the firm's
decision. 200 Similarly, the "necessity" of Kodacolor HI to the 110 camera was a
"slippery concept," as was the question of product quality.20 ' The only
question that could be answered, the court said, was whether there was
sufficient demand for the product, as there was in the instant case, to make it
worthwhile.
202
Nevertheless, it is not enough to allow a monopolist to bring new products
193. Id.
194. Id. at 286. The court stated that, under Griffith, the mere existence of monopoly power
"whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired" is itself violative of § 2, "providling] it is coupled with
the purpose or intent to exercise [it]." Id. at 274 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,
107 (1948)) (emphasis added). The court, however, inferred unlawful intent only from evidence of
palpably anticompetitive conduct, and considered evidence of subjective intent relevant only to
divine the nature and effect of ambiguous conduct. Id. at 288 (citing United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., 567 F.2d 701,
712 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978)).
195. Id. at 282, 285. "Hence the function of the court includes 'undoing" what the monopoly
achieved by its illegal acts." Id. at 285 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 171 (1948)). Accordingly, a rival camera maker, harmed by Kodak's refusal to deal
with it, might be remedied by being permitted "to share from the start in the business created by
its own changes in format." 603 F.2d at 285.
196. Id. at 282.
197. Id. at 281 (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.. 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiant, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)).
198. 603 F.2d at 283.
199. Id. at 281, 283; see note 74 supra.
200. Id. at 282. Enforced predisclosure is totally uncertain in its application and "explainis
why no court has ever imposed the duty Berkey seeks to create here." Id.
201. Id. at 286.
202. Id. at 287.
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to market whenever and wherever it chooses, without a limited inquiry into
the purpose and effect of the design change to ensure that it does not represent
the use of monopoly power in one market to foreclose competition in another.
Although the objective test of success in the marketplace is to be commended
for eliminating the battle between the experts and for providing an incentive
to innovate, success in the market may reflect no more than the consumer's
familiarity with the monopolist's products or lack of viable choice. Kodak
might have coercively used its film monopoly, for example, had it not offered
various other film formats which customers could use with other manufactur-
ers' cameras. 20 3 In addition, a redesigned product at a lower price while
deemed a superior product under an objective test, might in fact represent the
financial ability of a monopolist with sufficient power over one product to
incorporate any number of nonfunctional design changes, with no purpose
other than to eliminate rivals in the related product market. 2
0 4
m11. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
There are at least two options available to resolve the uncertainty surround-
ing section 2: require palpably anticompetitive conduct under an objective
economic test, or require no conduct at all and base liability on proof of
monopoly power persistently maintained. The solution lies in both; each in its
own way injects greater certainty into the "unclear and somewhat confused
legal standards '20 5 underlying section 2 enforcement. Because each approach
is supported by precedent,20 6 the critical issue is not whether one is "right" and
the other "wrong"; rather, the issue is under what circumstances each is
appropriate.
203. The court suggested that the requisite degree of coercion might be proved by evidence
that the decision to restrict Kodacolor II to the 110 format for 18 months after the 110 system
introduction, was not justified by the nature of the film, but was motivated by a specific Intent to
impede competition in the camera market. 603 F.2d at 287 n.39.
204. See id. at 283. The Second Circuit noted the absence in Kodak of "the possibility lurking
in Memorex that [the monopolist], by creating technological incompatibilities, was tying periph-
erals sales to its [primary product]." Id. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C
73-1832, slip op. at 79 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979), interprets CalComp as providing for a more
flexible analytical approach which permits the factfinder to consider the "effects" of a design
change on competitors and on consumers, the degree to which it was the product of "desirable
technological creativity," and the monopolist's intent, "since a contemporaneous evaluation by the
actor should be helpful . . . in determining the effects of a technological change." Id.
205. National Commission, supra note 22, at 143-44 (uncertainty requires no-conduct ap-
proach); see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427) (uncertainty requires
objective approach).
206. Compare Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427) and California
Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713 (9th Cir. 1979) with
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) and United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd 384 U.S. 563 (1966) and United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
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A. The Private Action and the Public Interest
The interests of the private plaintiff and that of the public are not
necessarily the same.20 7 The private antitrust plaintiff, by definition the less
successful rival in a market, wishes to restrain competition by the dominant
firm in order to obtain a greater share of the coveted market. 20 8 The resulting
treble-damage action may or may not serve the public interest in promoting
competition, depending of course on whether the conduct sought to be
restrained is in fact anticompetitive or merely a legitimate competitive prac-
tice.
The arguments in favor of objective economic tests for permissible business
practices reflect an understanding that the private litigant has a limited
interest in promoting vigorous competition. The absence of objective stan-
dards may result in treble-damage awards that subsidize less efficient firms
20 9
and in restraints on honestly industrial practices that have a chilling effect on
competition. 210 Furthermore, without objective tests, courts and businessmen
operate under precedents which are inadequate guides for predictable
decision-making. 
211
Moreover, the policy underlying the private cause of action supports the
recent trend toward objective standards. Private litigants are enlisted in the
antitrust enforcement effort to help prevent anticompetitive practices which
escape detection by public agencies. 212 In theory at least, the threat of liability
207. "[N]o principle of justice or social ordering would warrant extracting a penalty from an
innocent defendant, who committed no act identifiable as reprehensible, in order to confer a
bounty upon a private citizen .... There is, after all, a difference between the government
plaintiff and the 'private attorney general.' The government agency is much more likely than
private parties to exercise the kind of restraint which the public interest requires .... 2 P.
Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 311, at 35.
208. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 125 (N.D.
Cal. Oct 18, 1979).
209. See Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (treble damages
claim bearing no relationship to competitive, or "antitrust," injury); California Computer Prods.,
Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) c 62,713, at 77,980 (9th Cir. 1979); Hanson v.
Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1074 (1977) M"The
Sherman Act is not a subsidy for inefficiency."); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927
(10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
210. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert.
filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM
Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 125 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979); 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra
note 2, T 614, at 35-36.
211. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 603 F.2d 263, 282 (2d Cir. 1979), petiton for cert.
filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427); 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note
2, 626c; see Baker, Section 2 Enforcemet--The View From the Trench, 41 A.B.A. Antitrust L J.
613 (1972) ("Law in general, and antitrust law in particular, tends to be most effective where it
can focus on particular conduct and its effects-for then individual cases can produce useful rules
giving general guidance.').
212. The treble-damage provision, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), was designed to enlist private
parties "as allies of the Government in enforcing the antitrust laws," 51 Cong. Rec. 16319 (1914)
(remarks of Rep. Floyd), and to give the injured party "ample damages for the wrong suffered."
Id. at 9073 (remarks of Rep. Webb).
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for punitive damages 213 restrains monopoly firms from engaging in anticom-
petitive conduct that injures rivals, thereby injuring the public through
decreased competition. When there are no objective standards, the treble-
damage action becomes an unpredictable, anticompetitive weapon in the
hands of a less successful competitor.
Unreasonable conduct should be the focus of the private cause of action.
The rule of reason analysis established in Standard Oil, and the vagueness of
the Sherman Act itself, were intended to allow then unknown practices to be
incorporated within the Act's prohibition should future courts find them to be
unreasonable restraints of trade. The Standard Oil Court did not suggest that
the conduct requirement could be met by less than "unreasonable" restraints
of trade, 21 4 but only that courts were free to decide what practices were
unreasonably restrictive of competition. Considerations of fairness in meting
out reward and punishment and the need to preserve proper economic
incentives militate against the adoption of a general course of conduct
approach in private actions. No one, including the sponsors of the Sherman
Act 21  and the courts subsequently interpreting it, 216 is entirely comfortable
with the notion that a firm can be civilly liable for success alone.21 7 To
condemn ultimate success would not only be a disincentive to vigorous
competition, but would also deprive a firm of a major reason to exert its best
efforts once it has achieved dominance.
Moreover, businessmen must have notice of what is violative of the law; 218
when the proscribed conduct is left undefined, the law neither restrains
213. "[Tlreble damages are indisputably punishment." 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note
2, 311, at 34. Contra, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W.
3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427) ("trebling of damages is compensatory in the special sense
that it tends to ensure, albeit in a rough fashion, that wrongs do not go unredressed because of
the inherent difficulty or impossibility of proving all items of damages").
214. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., No. C 73-1832, slip op. at 125 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 18, 1979). "It is the choice of an unreasonable alternative, not the failure to choose the
least restrictive alternative, that leads to liability." Id.
215. See notes 25-40 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 123-204 supra and accompanying text.
217. "[A] strong argument can be made that, although, the result may expose the public to the
evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which It is
its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
218. In a post-trial motion to the district court, Kodak attacked § 2 as unconstitutionally void
for vagueness. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 436 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S.
Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427). "[Dlefendant says that it 'does not here challenge the application of
the antitrust laws in cases like Alcoa or United Shoe, nor . . . contend that the results reached
there were necessarily unconstitutional.' Those were decisions by judges, defendant argues, and
involved merely equitable relief, not huge damage claims. It is one thing the argument runs, to
have judges manipulate concepts like 'honestly industrial,' 'exclusionary,' and 'anticompetitive,'
for purposes of decreeing future changes in the lives of large corporations, It is something quite
different to unleash a jury under such concepts to consider large money claims 'that retrospec-
tively punish conduct newly found to violate the law.' " Id. at 436-37 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
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economically undesirable results nor encourages legitimate competitive behav-
ior. The deliberateness test, based strictly on general intent inferred from a
course of conduct, does not serve that goal,2 19 nor does a test based strictly on
specific intent evidenced by contemporaneous documents. 220 As the district
court in Transamerica Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp.2 2' recently observed:
The punitive impact of the antitrust laws must not be permitted to compel high prices.
Unless some objective, understandable standard is established for the guidance of
businessmen, they must either forego competitive price decreases or risk punitive
damages that might turn on some careless word once spoken in a board room.--
In exorcising the demon "intent," however, the objective tests imposed in
some recent cases are clearly too lenient; certain acts may be predatory despite
their failure to meet an objective economic test. 223 While strict objective tests
of predatory conduct serve as needed guidelines for businessmen and courts,
the judiciary should not be constrained from inquiring into intent, evidence of
which is perhaps indispensable in determining the reasonableness of alleged
anticompetitive conduct. 224
B. The Government Action and the Public Interest
In enacting the Sherman Act, Congress made it unlawful for a single firm to
monopolize; it gave the government broad power to seek, and the courts the
power to order, an equitable decree for divestiture in the public interest.225
Equitable relief in a government section 2 case is a remedy, not a penalty. 22 6
As such, it is used to restore competitive conditions to an industry in the
future, and to ensure that market structures will not retard healthy competi-
tive processes.22 7 Hence, its principal concern should not be the adjudication
of past conduct;228 even in the absence of deliberate impairment of competi-
tion, "an industry which does not have a competitive structure will not have
competitive behavior."2 29
If there are markets in which the self-policing functions of private compet-
219. See notes 51-85 supra and accompanying text.
220. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
221. No. C 73-1832 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1979).
222. Id., slip op. at 48; see Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary
Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 396 n.77 (courts should
consider cautiously "the excited prose often adopted by middle management").
223. See notes 144-67, 202-04 supra and accompanying text.
224. Id.
225. The Sherman Act § 4 vests the district courts "with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of [this actl and it shall be the duty of.. . [the government] to institute proceedings in
equity to prevent and restrain such violation . . . and praying that such violations shall be
enjoined or otherwise prohibited." 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
226. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338 (1947); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945); see 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra
note 2, 620, at 46.
227. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y, 1950);
see .2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 311c, 312.
228. National Commission, supra note 22, at 158.
229. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 426 (1956) (Warren,
C.J., dissenting).
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itors do not preserve a competitive market, a government action for divesti-
ture based on a less severe standard of proof could provide the remedy.
Instructive in this regard is Professor Williamson's work on market failure
considerations. 230 Williamson posits largely hypothetical "market failures,"
wherein a dominant firm, in an industry that has reached maturity, is
relatively immune from competitive inroads by actual and potential market
participants. Williamson contends that a firm's dominance may result from
the relative ineptness of extant and potential rivals, or from mere luck.
231
Because such market failures might exist despite the free play of the mar-
ketplace, Williamson concludes that use of the conduct approach is dubi-
ous.
23 2 Instead, he believes that section 2 "should be interpreted . . . to
require a finding that persistent dominance is presumptively unlawful, pro-
vided only that the industry [has] reached an advanced stage of develop-
ment. " 2
33
According to Williamson, those who endorse an objective conduct approach
assume that, except for monopolies resulting from lawful patents or economies
of scale, persistent dominance of an industry by a single firm will not
occur. 234 The corollary is that the competitive force of the marketplace will
dissipate dominant market power absent unreasonable restraints of trade.23s
Williamson acknowledges that competitive forces generally will dissipate
concentrated industry structures, but that "aberrations can and will ap-
pear. 236 The issue becomes whether the antitrust laws should be addressed to
230. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considera-
tions, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1512 (1972).
231. Id. at 1516-22. "To paraphrase [Williamson's] figure of speech: that the tortoise
beat out the hare does not mean that he had the speed of a gazelle." 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner,
supra note 2, 624b n.4. This aspect of Williamson's analysis has been criticized as "focusing on
the relative inefficiency of competitors, instead of the relative efficiency of the target company.
But the leader is still the best, even if only the best of a poor lot (determined, of course, with
perfect academic hindsight)." National Commission, supra note 22, at 361 n.7 (separate statement
of Comm'r Hatch) (emphasis in original). This deficiency in Williamson's "market failure"
analysis can be remedied under a persistent monopoly standard by requiring an inquiry into the
efficiency of firms that have failed to make inroads into the monopolized market. Such a failure,
despite high efficiencies, should be convincing evidence of persistency.
232. Williamson, supra note 230, at 15 13-14. The conduct approach makes antitrust enforce-
ment a "charade." Substantial enforcement resources are expended identifying dominant firm
industries. Once such industries are identified, however, the main effort shifts to scrutinizing the
behavior of dominant firms in order to dredge up some evidence of offensive conduct. "That
objectively the conduct in question could not reasonably lead to the dominance result is simply
disregarded." Id. at 1515.
233. Id. at 1524-25. This presumption requires the somewhat impractical determination that
an industry has reached its "mature" stage of development. Williamson suggests that "[elxpert
opinion together with statistical tests, for example, fitting the industry's development history to a
logistic curve," would suffice. Id. at 1525 n.44. That such tests have a place in econometric
models hardly recommends their use by courts. For a more comprehensible standard, see note 254
infra.
234. Williamson, supra note 230, at 1513-14.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1514. New entry into a mature industry may be all but impossible as a result of
significant structural barriers to entry. Such barriers may be a function merely of the stage of
development of an industry. Id. at 1520; see F. Scherer, supra note 31, at 74; Kaysen & Turner,
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average tendencies as opposed to concededly rare "aberrations."2 37 It is
contended that the private treble-damage action should address the former,
on the assumption that competition works. Should a market failure be found
to exist in a particular industry, the solution lies in a government suit for
divestiture under a more liberal no-conduct standard.
The proposed no-conduct standard in government cases is not without
precedent. The decision in Alcoa, itself, left little or nothing of substance to
the conduct requirement: any act by a monopolist is unlawful monopoliza-
tion. 238 Judge Hand 239 acknowledged that the role of conduct was de
minimis, stating that the distinction between mere possession of monopoly
power--"monopoly in the concrete" 24°-and unlawful monopolization is a
purely formal one, valid only so long as the monopolist remains "wholly
inert. ' 241 The distinction disappears as soon as a monopolist begins to
operate; "the [monopoly] power and its exercise must... coalesce."2 42 Hence,
although Alcoa obscured the issue by creating the fiction of course of conduct,
the result can be justified by distinguishing the acquisition of monopoly power
from its persistent retention over a substantial period of time.24 3
The proper concern of the government cause of action is substantial market
power, that is, the effective power to fix prices and exclude competitors.
When substantial and persistent control of a market exists, courts should not
require government lawyers to expend limited enforcement resources on
proving anticompetitive acts, an inquiry which is largely unrelated to the
perceived defects of a market. The concern in the private arena that the
elimination of conduct proof would be unfair and a disincentive to valid
competition is mitigated by at least three factors peculiar to the government
action. First, the monopolist is rewarded for its success by being permitted to
reap monopoly profits until such time as its monopoly power is deemed
"persistent." 244 Second, if divestiture were ordered, the monopolist would not
supra note 30, 73-75. There may, however, be offsetting cost advantages to coming into an
industry at a late stage. "For example, successes can be imitated and failures avoided; late
entrants may enjoy a free ride on the market development efforts of their predecessors."
Williamson, supra note 230, at 1520 n.33; see, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No.
79-427); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713
(9th Cir. 1979).
237. Williamson, supra note 230, at 1514; see 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, c 618b,
at 42. "The self-correcting tendency is, after all, a tendency and not an absolute assurance." Id.
238. At least one commentary has claimed that, "[in theory at least, this is hardly a
requirement at all; it is more a necessary concomitant of monopoly power." Blecher & Woodhead,
supra note 51, at 119.
239. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
240. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). While noting the absence in
§ 2 of any prohibition of "monopoly in the concrete," Justice White also said that § 2 reaches
"every act bringing about the prohibited results." Id. at 61.
241. 148 F.2d at 428.
242. Id. As soon as the monopolist begins to operate, that is, as soon as it begins to sell at all,
"it must sell at some price, and the only price at which it could sell is a price which it itself fixed."
Id.
243. See Turner, supra note 2, at 1219.
244. One reason the no-conduct standard would not be unfair if applied to an "innocent"
1979]
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be punitively liable for treble damages. 24 5 Finally, although private antitrust
suits are numerous, government no-conduct actions can be expected to be
rare. 
246
Recognizing these factors, the National Commission for the Review of
Antitrust Laws and Procedures (the Commission) recommends the elimination
of the conduct element from section 2 government cases. 247 Under the
majority Commission proposal, the government could obtain structural relief
in section 2 cases without proof of culpable conduct. 24 8 Upon a showing of
monopolist is that the monopolist would be able to earn monopoly profits for several years as a
reward for its superior performance. To this extent, dissolving persistent monopoly power is "no
more unfair than limiting a patent monopoly to 17 years." National Commission, supra note 22,
at 173-74 n.58; see Turner, supra note 2, at 1220.
245. National Commission, supra note 22, at 173-74 n.58. Dissolution does not expropriate
the monopolist's assets. When the defendant is compelled to sell some portion of Its business, It or
its shareholders receive the proceeds of the sale or stock ownership in the newly created firms. 3
P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 620, at 46.
246. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, T 313, at 44. The Antitrust Division currently
can only handle about three major section 2 cases at a time without detracting from its other
essential enforcement activities. Shepard, supra note 41, at 599. It is unlikely that a firm without
monopoly power would curtail its competitive efforts because of the remote possibility that it
might win a monopoly and retain it long enough to provoke a suit for equitable relief. Moreover,
once having obtained monopoly power, inevitable delays in attacking and remedying persistent
monopoly would guarantee the actor considerable gain from its power. 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner,
supra note 2, 622e, at 62. Given the government's limited enforcement resources, it would be
unrealistic for the government to attempt to restructure more than a few markets; a rational use
of enforcement resources would suggest avoiding intervention in "close" cases. Id. 620a, at 44;
see Turner, supra note 2, at 1214-15.
247. National Commission, supra note 22, at 142. There have been similar legislative
attempts in the past. both introduced by the late Sen. Philip A. Hart. Monopolization Reform
Act, S. 3429, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in Maher, supra note 22, at 4, col. 6;
Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 1167, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 11494
(1972). The Industrial Reorganization Act would have amended the Sherman Act to make the
mere possession of monopoly power unlawful. The bill provided for a rebuttable presumption of
monopoly power when either 1) a firm has maintained a rate of profit in excess of 15% for five
consecutive years; 2) there has been no substantial price competition among two or more firms in
an industry for three years; or 3) four or fewer firms account for 50% or more of sales in a market
in any year. The Monopolization Reform Act of 1976 would have amended the Sherman Act to
eliminate the "skill, foresight and industry" defense to a i 2 case brought by the government. A
defendant could avoid divestiture only upon a showing that such a remedy would result In the
loss of substantial economies of scale. See Note, The Industrial Reorganization Act: An Antitrust
Proposal To Restructure The American Economy, 73 Colum. L. R. 633 (1973). Representative
William S. Cohen correctly predicted that these legislative initiatives challenge the "conventional
wisdom in Congress and . . . will prove to be academically interesting, I think, but politically
futile." Cohen, Perspectives from the Congress; The Legislative Realities of Strengthening Section
2, 10 Sw. U. L. Rev. 53, 59 (1978).
248. National Commission, supra note 22, at 157-59. Another position taken urges the courts
to adopt the test set forth in the district court opinion in Grinnell, 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964),
aff'd in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966), that persistent monopoly power shall be presumed to have been
caused by culpable conduct. Culpable conduct need not be shown as a part of the government's
prima facie case, but its inference may be rebutted by the defendant. National Commission, supra
note 22, at 157, 160-61. Finally, some members of the Commission have insisted that the
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persistent monopoly power, a court would be required to order a plan for
divestiture unless the defendant were able to demonstrate that such relief
would destroy substantial efficiencies of scale.24 9
According to the Commission report, "even if the government is not required
to offer affirmative proof of conduct, it is highly unlikely that the adoption of
a no-conduct standard would impose liability on an 'innocent' monopolist.I' M"
Underlying the proposal is the critical concept of "persistent monopoly
power," 251 an idea that has been criticized as inadequately defined by the
Commission.25 2 The Commission suggested, however, an express presumption
that persistent monopoly power is maintained through deliberate conduct that
would violate traditional section 2 standards.25 3 That presumption, in turn,
reflects two related beliefs: that merely restraining unlawful acts will not
prevent industrial concentration nor insure a competitive market; and that
persistently maintained monopoly power without competitive inroads indi-
cates a market failure even absent deliberate conduct.
"Persistent maintainance," 254 however, like the concept of monopoly
power, should be defined by the courts, and not by statute. In government
suits, the courts, relying upon Alcoa, 255 United Shoe, 2 5 6 and the district court
opinion in Grinnell,257 should rule that monopoly power persistently main-
tained is unlawful regardless of whether it was acquired or maintained by
traditional conduct requirement be preserved as part of the plaintiff's case-in-chief. Id. at 157,
161-62.
249. Id. at 158-59. The efficiencies defense would be permitted only at the relief stage of the
case; eliminating the "skill, foresight and industry" defense from the trial on liability would
thereby "concentrate the efforts of both government and defense counsel on the issue of whether
relief would harm consumer welfare by destroying efficiencies." Id. at 158.
250. Id. at 156-57.
251. Id. at 152. Persistent monopoly proposals differed in their details: one would allow only
engineeringlplant economies of scale as a defense to dissolution at the remedy phase; another
differed mainly in allowing any scale efficiency, including management efficiencies, to be a
defense to liability itself; a final proposal would attack only those firms with annual sales of over
$500 million which have possessed monopoly power for at least five years. Id. at 171-72 n.35.
252. The Commission's recommendation has been faulted for reliance on what one could
"generously call a thin record." National Commission, supra note 22, at 392-93 (separate
statement of Comm'r Javits); accord, id. at 357 (separate statement of Comm'r Hatch) (recommen-
dation "based on concepts which are nowhere defined"). The example of "persistent monopoly
power" suggested informally was "a monopoly of 5 years duration (a monopoly defined as 65
percent of the market) and annual sales of over $500 million." Id. at 392. Another Commissioner
concluded that "it is not clear . . . that we as yet have the knowledge to enable us to identify
[persistent monopoly power] with the precision necessary for a law of the sort proposed here." Id.
at 410 (separate statement of Comm'r Dixon); see note 254 infra.
253. National Commission, supra note 22, at 141.
254. 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, T 623d, at 66. Areeda & Turner reject
Williamson's "mature industry" analysis of market persistency, and suggest a standard which
would 1) preclude intervention until a firm has held monopoly power for at least five years; 2)
"permit intervention between five and 10 years only on a convincing showing of likely
persistency;" and 3) certainly intervene against substantial market power that has persisted 10
years or more. Id. at 67.
255. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
256. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass, 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
257. 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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deliberately exclusionary conduct. 258 The fatal weakness of the proposed
no-conduct legislation is that, by embodying the idea in statute, it takes away
judicial flexibility. Any such standards must be determined by the courts; only
they are capable of balancing competing interests on the facts of any adjudi-
cated case. A judicial solution to the paradox of section 2 may be more
administratively burdensome than a legislative fiat that all firms with a
specified market share will be conclusively presumed to have violated section
2. Nevertheless, the Sherman Act was intended, in the words of Chief Justice
Hughes, to be "a charter of freedom [with a] generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does
not go into detailed definitions which might either work injury to legitimate
enterprise or through particularization defeat its purposes by providing
loopholes for escape. ' 259 As such, "the Sherman Act [represents] a broad set
of principles that are to be interpreted by the judiciary in light of evolving
economic and social conditions.
'260
CONCLUSION
"[T]he fundamental tension--one might almost say the paradox-that is near
the heart of § 2"1261 can not be resolved without expressly differentiating
between private treble-damage actions and government suits for divestiture.
A strong argument can be made that distinct caselaw and burdens of proof for
private suits and government suits have always existed.262 This understand-
ing, however, must be explicit. Without such an expression, courts and
258. National Commission, supra note 22, at 160; 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2,
V 622f.
259. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
260. National Commission, supra note 22, at 143; see 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2,
106, at 15-16; 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, T 313c.
261. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427). The court further stated:
"Thus, while proclaiming vigorously that monopoly power is the evil at which § 2 is aimed,
courts have declined to take what would have appeared to be the next logical step-declaring
monopolies unlawful per se unless specifically authorized by law. . . .This tension [inherent In
§ 21 creates much of the confusion surrounding § 2. It makes the cryptic Alcoa opinion a litigant's
wishing well, into which, it sometimes seems, one may peer and find nearly anything he wishes."
Id.
262. See note 206. Contra, Berkey Photo, Inc. v, Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404,
438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427). In that case, the court held that treble
damages based squarely upon "the principles of Alcoa and United Shoe" are not unconstitutional
for failing to give fair notice of proscribed conduct. Id. at 437-39; see note 218 supra.
"[Defendant's argument] is actually premised upon an inaccurate supposition that there is a sharp
dichotomy between [government] suits in equity and [private] damage claims." Id. at 438. But see
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 298 n.57 (2d Cir. 1979), petitionfor
cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1979) (No. 79-427) In that case the court found It
"interesting to note" that Areeda and Turner would permit the break-up of a persistent monopoly
even in the absence of exclusionary conduct. See 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 2, 9 614, at
36 ("the major [government] precedents are in part consistent with, and in any event best
rationalized by," a no-conduct approach).
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private litigants may become hopelessly lost in the midst of confused stan-
dards and conflicting precedents. Moreover, the resulting confusion and need
to articulate objective standards of conduct may emasculate the government
suit for divestiture under section 2.
It is unquestionable that there are serious problems with adopting such a
"double standard" for monopolization. Conflicting policy considerations have
been inherent in the Sherman Act since its inception. That fact alone must not
bar courts from developing workable standards for proof of monopolization.
To this end, courts must insist that private plaintiffs base their antitrust
claims on injury resulting from identifiable anticompetitive conduct. In ad-
judicating private suits, courts should reject arguments drawn from the Alcoa
"wishing well."' 26 3 The structural cases, however, remain convincing prece-
dent for a no-conduct standard in government cases based on a finding of
persistent monopoly power. It is time the courts expressly state what for so
long has only been implied.
John Andrew Maher
263. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Sept_ 14, 1979) (No. 79-427).
